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1 
Telemarketing, Technology, and the 
Regulation of Private Speech 
FIRST AMENDMENT LESSONS FROM THE FCC’S 
TCPA RULES 
Justin (Gus) Hurwitz† 
INTRODUCTION 
The late 1980s brought a new terror into the world, “the 
scourge of civilization,”1 one that is with us to this day: the 
unsolicited commercial phone call. Increasingly sophisticated 
digital technologies and rapidly falling costs enabled unsavory 
marketers to reach out and touch hundreds, thousands, or even 
more potential customers per hour. They did this through a 
combination of automated telephone dialers—simple computers 
that would dial phone numbers sequentially2—and prerecorded or 
artificial voice messages.3 
Unfortunately for this new breed of telemarketers, their 
business was problematic for both consumers and the 
architecture of the telephone industry. The calls often came in 
the evening as families were sitting down to dinner or watching 
prime-time television—it was a different era, remember—and 
 
 † Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Space, Cyber, and Telecom Law 
Program, University of Nebraska College of Law. J.D., University of Chicago, 2007; M.A. 
(economics), George Mason University, 2010; B.A., St. John’s College, 2003. Participants 
at the Internet Law Works-in-Progress, UNL College of Law Faculty Workshop and 
George Mason University Antonin Scalia School of Law Center for the Study of the 
Administrative State Research Roundtable offered helpful feedback on earlier versions 
of this article. Thanks to Kyle Langvardt, Eric Berger, Eugene Volokh, and Sheldon 
Gilbert for particularly helpful feedback. 
 1 As characterized by Senator Hollings. See Ajit Pai, FCC is Voting to End 
Robocalls, the ‘Scourge of Civilization’, HILL (Mar. 23, 2017, 8:40 AM EDT), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/325352-fcc-is-voting-to-end-robocalls-the
-scourge-of-civilization [https://perma.cc/2ZLE-LP9N]. 
 2 E.g., 555-0001, 555-0002, 555-0003, etc. 
 3 See S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 2 (1991); see also Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Lisa 
Boardman Burnette, Telemarketing Tug-of-War: Balancing Telephone Information 
Technology and the First Amendment with Consumer Protection and Privacy, 43 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1057–58 (1992). 
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seemed a grotesque invasion of their privacy.4 Because this was 
before the widespread availability of Caller ID, the people had 
no way to differentiate wanted calls from unwanted ones, as 
these calls were deceptive, placing consumers in the impossible 
position of either missing calls from friends and family or 
answering calls from marketers. Additionally, these calls were 
also problematic due to the technical and economic features of the 
telephone network itself: they could tie up business and 
residential phone lines for hours at a time, fill up answering 
machine tapes, and even impose consequential costs on cell phone 
or fax machine owners.5 
In response to these concerns, Congress enacted the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).6 The TCPA 
provided general legal principles to govern the use of automatic 
telephone dialing systems and artificial or prerecorded messages,7 
and directed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to 
further develop these principles into rules.8 The lodestone 
principle of the TCPA is that, subject to certain exceptions, it is 
unlawful to use automatic dialing systems or prerecorded 
messages to make phone calls except with the prior express 
consent of the called party.9 In the past twenty-six years, Congress 
and the FCC have revisited the TCPA and the rules made 
pursuant to it numerous times, but both bodies have remained 
faithful to this principle.10 
 
 4 See Simon van Zuylen-Wood, How Robo-callers Outwitted the Government 
and Completely Wrecked the Do Not Call List, WASH. POST MAG. (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/how-robo-call-moguls-outwitted-
the-government-and-completely-wrecked-the-do-not-call-list/2018/01/09/52c769b6-df7a-
11e7-bbd0-9dfb2e37492a_story.html [https://perma.cc/XXL7-2JLG]. 
 5 These concerns are introduced in greater detail in Section I.A., infra. 
 6 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 
2394, 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)) (finding, inter alia, that “[t]he 
use of the telephone to market goods and services to the home and other businesses is now 
pervasive due to the increased use of cost-effective telemarketing techniques. . . . Many 
consumers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes 
from telemarketers. . . . Technologies that might allow consumers to avoid receiving such 
calls are not universally available, are costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an 
inordinate burden on the consumer.”); see also S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 2 (1991) (discussing 
harms of unsolicited telemarketing calls). 
 7 Telephone Consumer Protection Act § 227. 
 8 Id. The FCC first implemented such rules in Rules and Regulations 
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752, 8753 
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 TCPA Order]. 
 9 See infra Section I.B. 
 10 See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–74, § 301(a), 129 Stat. 584, 
588 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012 & Supp. IV 2017)); Truth in Caller ID 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-331, § 2, 124 Stat. 3572, 3572 (2010) (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. §§ 227, 609 (2012)); Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-21, §§ 2(a)–(g), 
3, 119 Stat. 359, 359–62 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, 609 (2012)); CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-187, §  3, 117 Stat. 2699, 2700 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7702 (2012)); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 
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As every modern telephone owner knows, the TCPA has not 
eliminated the scourge of unwanted telephone calls. To the 
contrary, today there are as many as 4.2 billion robocalls placed 
each month, as much as 59 percent of which are made using 
technologies that falsify or mask the identity of the caller.11 Who 
has not received a call from “Rachel from Card Services”?12 But 
while the basic problem today seems similar to that of 1991, so 
much about the ecosystem has changed that the underlying 
problems are almost all fundamentally different. To consider just a 
few examples: today, these calls come throughout the day, mostly 
to cell phones; Caller ID is pervasive; the U.S. government has 
developed a comprehensive (if ineffective) Do-Not-Call regime; 
callers use complex tricks to make called parties think they are 
talking to a human; and automatic dialers are far smarter, such 
that they are far less likely to tie up phone lines for more than a 
few seconds (if the call goes unanswered).13 
 
No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1002 
(2012)); Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 102-556, 106 Stat. 
4181 (1992) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5701, 5711 (2012)); see also Rules and 
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Report and 
Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 9074, 9079 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 TCPA Order]; Rules and 
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, TCPA 
Omnibus Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7967–68 (2015) [hereinafter 
2015 TCPA Order]; Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, Report and Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830, 1832 (2012) [hereinafter 
2012 TCPA Order]; Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991, Second Order on Reconsideration, 20 FCC Rcd. 3788, 3801 (2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 TCPA Order]; Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115 (2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 TCPA Order]; Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Order on Further Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd. 4609, 4609 
(1997) [hereinafter 1997 TCPA Order]; Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 12391, 
12396 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 TCPA Order]; 1992 TCPA Order, supra note 8, at 8753. 
 11 See August 2018 Nationwide Robocall Data, YOUMAIL ROBOCALL INDEX, 
https://robocallindex.com/2018/august [https://perma.cc/8CQB-AQ9M] (Sept. 21, 2018); 
see also Advanced Methods to Target & Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, 32 FCC Rcd. 
2306, 2331–34 (2017) (statements of Chairman Pai and Commissioner Clyburn). For 59 
percent number, see Laura J. Nelson, FTC Hangs up on Robocalls from ‘Rachel’, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/01/business/la-fi-tn-ftc-robocalls
-credit-card-services-20121101 [https://perma.cc/H6Q6-GLVE]; Spencer Weber Waller et 
al., The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to 
Changing Technology, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 343, 390–91 (2014); Marissa A. Potts, 
Note, “Hello, it’s me. [Please don’t sue me!]” Examining the FCC’s Overbroad Calling 
Regulations Under the TCPA, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 302 (2016). 
 12 See, e.g., Bikram Bandy, What’s the Deal with “Rachel from Card Services”? 
Your Top 3 Questions Answered, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. BLOG (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/whats-deal-rachel-card-services-your-top-3-questions-an
swered [https://perma.cc/NZ97-XXLK]; Andrew Johnson, The FTC Gets Rachel the 
Robocaller . . . Again, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. BLOG (June 14, 2016), https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/ftc-gets-rachel-robocaller-again [https://perma.cc/U6YD-EYV4]. 
 13 The evolution of the scope and changing nature of the problem of unwanted 
phone calls is captured by a recent comic: 
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In addition, many of today’s callers are engaged in complex 
scams unrelated to the call itself.14 A significant volume of bad-
faith callers—the “Rachel[s] from Card Services” and those 
making calls as part of scams unrelated to the calls themselves—
use technologies to conceal, and are engaging in scams that do not 
require them to reveal their identities.15 That is, they cannot be 
sued because they cannot be found; and because they cannot be 
sued, they do not care about the TCPA and make no effort to 
comply with it.16 The government does have a compelling interest 
in curtailing these callers but the TCPA does little to accomplish 
this goal. Legitimate businesses, however, are constrained by the 
contours of the law and the market. This is a fundamental 
difference between the challenges that the TCPA was written to 
address in 1991 and the challenges that are faced today. The 
contemporary problem of unwanted telephone calls stems not 
from those callers who attempt to comply with the TCPA but from 
those who ignore it. 
This article takes a fresh look at the constitutionality of 
the TCPA.17 Since it was enacted, the Act has survived numerous 
 
 
Randall Munroe, Incoming Calls, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/2053/ [https://perma.cc/LRL4-QT9E]. 
 14 Mike Snider, Don’t Say ‘Yes’ When Robocall Scam Rings, USA TODAY (Mar. 
28, 2017, 8:58 AM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2017/03/27/
dont-say-yes-when-robocall-scam-rings/99709634 [https://perma.cc/KS7G-XEKP]; see 
also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule In the Matter of Advanced 
Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls 5, 7 (July 3, 2017), 2017 WL 
2926645, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/107030687301373/P034412%20FCC%20NPRM%20
NOI%20Call%20Blocking%20Comment.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D7A-2VJ4]. 
 15 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE DO 
NOT CALL REGISTRY FEE EXTENSION ACT OF 2007 3 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/biennial-report-congress-under-do-not-call-registry-fee-extension-
act-2007-operation-national-do-not/biennial_do_not_call_report_fy_2016-2017_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EWD4-7846]. 
 16 See, e.g., id. 
 17 This article focuses on the TCPA and the FCC’s implementing rules. It is 
worth noting, however, that much of this analysis likely applies to the Do-Not-Call 
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challenges brought on First Amendment grounds. Courts have 
consistently found that the Act is subject to and survives 
intermediate scrutiny. But changes in technology, the market, 
and the law suggest that this conclusion may no longer be sound. 
Recent Supreme Court First Amendment precedent raises 
questions about the grounds on which prior courts have upheld 
the TCPA, leading some lower courts to subject the TCPA to 
strict scrutiny.18 This article argues that these recent cases are 
only the tip of the constitutional iceberg with which the TCPA is 
about to collide. In the modern setting, the basic purpose of (and 
problem with) the Act is that it attempts to curtail an 
illegitimate and substantially harmful subset of telephone calls 
using tools that silence a substantial volume of legitimate calls, 
with little effect on illegitimate speech. Not only does the Act 
possibly fail under recent strict scrutiny precedent, but it very 
likely fails even under intermediate scrutiny. 
What is more, the TCPA was largely premised on—and 
has generally been upheld based upon—Supreme Court 
precedent regarding the sanctity and sanctuary of the home. Over 
the course of the twentieth century, the Court decided several 
cases holding, under various factual permutations, that 
individuals have a strong privacy interest in their homes as a 
sanctuary from unwanted disturbance from the marketplace of 
ideas, but that once they leave that sanctuary there is limited 
right to privacy from unwanted speech, disturbance, and ideas.19 
But since the enactment of the TCPA, house-based landline 
telephones have been largely displaced by mobile cellular phones. 
Today, cell phones are a primary means by which individuals 
engage with one another, the public square, and the marketplace 
of ideas. Yet the TCPA applies to, and treats, mobile phones 
basically as a slightly more expensive analogue to traditional 
landline telephones, effectively extending the constitutional 
protections afforded to the sanctuary of the home to the sanctuary 
of the phone. This raises important questions about the ongoing 
viability of the TCPA as well as difficult questions about the 
extent to which the Constitution should recognize privacy 
interests in the modern public sphere. 
 
Implementation Act and the FTC’s rules implementing that Act. The Do-Not-Call Act is 
discussed to some degree below. See infra note 56. This article focuses on the TCPA, 
somewhat to the implicit exclusion of the Do-Not-Call Act, because the TCPA’s private 
cause of action both has significantly amplified concerns about the Act’s deleterious 
impacts on constitutionally-protected speech and also raises important questions about 
the government’s role in regulating speech between private parties that do not arise in 
the context of the Do-Not-Call list. 
 18 See infra Sections IV.A. & B. 
 19 See infra Section III.B. 
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This article begins in Part I with an overview of the TCPA. 
Part II then discusses three key types of changes since the TCPA 
was enacted in 1991: changes in the problem, the technological 
solutions, and the law itself. Part III turns to the broader questions 
raised by contemporary application of the TCPA: the propriety of 
the government’s restriction of private speech to address problems 
the government regulation itself created, and the questions that 
the principles of privacy underlying TCPA’s application in the 
contemporary setting raise about the distinction between public 
and private spaces. Parts IV and V analyze the contemporary 
application of the TCPA in light of current First Amendment law. 
Part V draws all of these threads together and offers a path 
forward, arguing that because current technology allows a great 
deal of flexibility, to both those placing and receiving unsolicited 
calls, in how those calls are managed, the FCC should encourage 
adoption of technologies, which give consumers greater control over 
these calls, instead of directly regulating speech in a continuation 
of its thus far ill-fated efforts to eliminate unwanted calls. 
I. THE TCPA’S LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND FIRST 
AMENDMENT HISTORY 
A. The TCPA’s Purpose 
The TCPA was enacted in 1991 nominally to “protect the 
privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers by placing 
restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the 
home and to facilitate interstate commerce by restricting certain 
uses of facsimile (fax) machines and automatic dialers.”20 In 
addition to this expressly identified purpose, the legislative 
history highlights “the use of automated equipment to engage in 
telemarketing” as its motivating concern, and identifies in its 
preamble the purpose of the legislation as being “to prohibit 
certain practices involving the use of telephone equipment for 
advertising and solicitation purposes.”21 The TCPA was adopted 
in response to particular concerns, including the following 
examples from the Senate Report: 
 
 20 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991). 
 21 Id. (emphasis added). “[T]elemarketing calls” and calls “for advertising and 
solicitation purposes” are the only type of calls identified as problematic by content in 
the Senate Report, and the report refers throughout back to “these calls” in discussing 
the purpose, motivation, and structure of the legislation. Id. at 1–3, 5, 9. The report also 
expressly addresses concerns raised by telemarketers and indicates that hearings were 
held at which telemarketers were invited to testify. Id. at 3–6. As discussed in the report, 
hearings and prior considered legislation addressed “telemarketing” and “[t]elephone 
[a]dvertising” by name. Id. at 6. 
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 automated calls are placed to lines reserved for emergency 
purposes, such as hospitals and fire and police stations; 
 the entity placing the automated call does not identify itself; 
 the automated calls fill the entire tape of an answering 
machine, preventing other callers from leaving messages; 
 the automated calls will not disconnect the line for a long 
time after the called party hangs up the phone, thereby 
preventing the called party from placing his or her own calls; 
 automated calls do not respond to human voice commands to 
disconnect the phone, especially in times of emergency; 
 some automatic dialers will dial numbers in sequence, 
thereby tying up all the lines of a business and preventing 
any outgoing calls; and 
 unsolicited calls placed to fax machines, and cellular or 
paging telephone numbers often impose a cost on the called 
party (fax messages require the called party to pay for the 
paper used, cellular users must pay for each incoming call, 
and paging customers must pay to return the call to the 
person who originated the call).22 
Understanding those concerns requires recognizing the 
technological setting as it existed in 1991. This was near the end of 
the era of “Ma Bell”—consumers generally could only get telephone 
service from a single local exchange carrier, and there was limited 
(but growing) competition in the long distance market.23 
Residential customers generally had one telephone line (and 
number) per house, which would ring several phones shared 
throughout the house when called.24 Commercially-available Caller 
ID was not yet available nationwide.25 Fax machines were an 
important and state-of-the-art means of communication.26 Cell 
phones were only just beginning to enter the consumer market.27 
 
 22 Id. at 2. 
 23 See Andrew Pollack, Bell System Breakup Opens Era of Great Expectations 
and Great Concern, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/01/us/
bell-system-breakup-opens-era-of-great-expectations-and-great-concern.html [https://
perma.cc/3Q5V-V5EV]. 
 24 See Mark Landler, Multiple Family Phone Lines, A Post-Postwar U.S. Trend, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/26/us/multiple-family-
phone-lines-a-post-postwar-us-trend.html [https://perma.cc/ENX4-64NY]. 
 25 See Anthony Ramirez, Caller ID: Consumer’s Friend or Foe?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 4, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/04/news/caller-id-consumer-s-friend-or-
foe.html [https://perma.cc/FP2M-D3NY]. 
 26 Lynn Simross, The Fax Revolution: At Home and at Work, Facsimile 
Machines Have Become the Essential Business Tools, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1991), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-11/news/vw-1950_1_fax-machine [https://perma.cc/
MQJ4-UZ9A]. 
 27 Calvin Sims, All About/Cellular Telephones; A Gadget That May Soon 
Become the Latest Necessity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/
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The entire consumer-facing side of the telephone system was 
analog.28 The last manual exchange in the United States—a system 
that required speaking to an operator in order to complete a call 
instead of just being able to dial a phone number—was not retired 
until the early 1990s.29 Some telephone customers in the United 
States relied on “party line” service (i.e., a phone line shared with 
several other houses), well into the 1980s.30 The underbelly of the 
system was also much more primitive: many telephone exchanges 
still relied on mechanical switches—switches that established 
phone calls by establishing a physical electrical circuit between 
telephones—instead of computerized electronic switches.31 These 
switches were in many ways inferior to their more modern 
electronic counterparts. For instance, they would not end a phone 
call, disconnecting the physical connection between each end, until 
both parties had hung up their side of the line.32 
Everything was also much more expensive. Short, 
domestic, long distance calls could cost several dollars and even 
local calls sometimes were not free.33 Cell phones—where they 
were available—similarly had high usage fees (not to mention that 
they were the size of a brick or even a briefcase and their batteries 
 
01/28/business/all-about-cellular-telephones-a-gadget-that-may-soon-become-the-latest-
necessity.html [https://perma.cc/WVW8-EMCC]. 
 28 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information 
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1065 (1994). 
 29 See Charles Hillinger, Pulling the Plug: Phone Company to Replace Last 
Manual Switchboard, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-
08/news/mn-130_1_manual-switchboard [https://perma.cc/W6KQ-GUEH]. 
 30 Party Lines were popular in the middle of the century, but by the 1970s were 
being phased out across most networks. See Bill Baird, AT&T Archives: Party Lines, AT&T 
TECH. CHANNEL (June 6, 2012), http://techchannel.att.com/play-video.cfm/2012/6/6/at&t-
archives-party-lines [https://perma.cc/RP5H-9RWB]. Some service continued through the 
1990s and even into the 2000s. See, e.g., Kelly P. Kissel, Technology Pulls Plug on Rural 
Party Lines: West Virginia: Customers Say Farewell to Their Old Telephone System with 
Mixture of Joy and Nostalgia, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-
10-22/news/mn-811_1_telephone-service [https://perma.cc/4Y88-PX8J]; Party Line Era 
Ends in State Bell Atlantic Converting Pennsylvania’s Final 110 Lines., MORNING CALL, 
(June 27, 2000), http://articles.mcall.com/2000-06-27/business/3301798_1_bell-atlantic-
caller-id-party-lines [https://perma.cc/2TMT-X9RS]; Wilson Ring, The Party’s Over for 
Rural Phone Customers in Green Mountain State, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 1999), http://articles.
latimes.com/1999/jan/31/news/mn-3380 [https://perma.cc/AH6H-FGWF]. 
 31 HENRY KRESSEL & THOMAS V. LENTO, COMPETING FOR THE FUTURE: HOW DIGITAL 
INNOVATIONS ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 68–69 (Cambridge University Press, ed. 2007). 
 32 See S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 13 (1991). 
 33 In 1989, calls overseas could cost well over $2.00 (1989 dollars) for the first 
minute and over $0.50 for each additional minute; calls from the Hawaii to Alaska cost 
$0.71 per minute; calls from mainland U.S. to Mexico cost $0.66 per minute; and the 
average call across the Continental U.S. cost $0.33 per minute. See FCC, STATISTICS OF 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS 217–27 (1990), https://www.fcc.gov/file/11631/
download [https://perma.cc/GWX7-UPT7] [hereinafter “1989 Common Carriers Report”]. 
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only allowed a short time of conversation).34 Most fax machines 
printed documents on expensive rolls of thermal paper.35 
At the same time, this was also an era of rapid technological 
change. Telephone networks were quickly transitioning to digital 
and computerized technologies, especially in the network core and 
for long distance service (that is, for everything except the last 
segment of the network that connected directly to consumers’ 
homes).36 The cost of calls fell precipitously as well, especially in the 
increasingly competitive long distance market.37 And with the 
growth of the computer and electronics markets, the devices that 
could connect to the network were increasingly more advanced.38 
It was these latter changes that gave rise to the 
problems that the TCPA was meant to address. As explained in 
the Senate report, 
Over the past few years, long distance telephone rates have fallen over 40 
percent, thereby reducing the costs of engaging in long distance 
telemarketing. The costs of telemarketing have fallen even more with the 
advent of automatic dialer recorded message players (ADRMPs) or 
automatic dialing and announcing devices (ADADs). These machines 
automatically dial a telephone number and deliver to the called party an 
artificial or prerecorded voice message. Certain data indicate that the 
machines are used by more than 180,000 solicitors to call more than 7 
million Americans every day.39 
 
 34 Sims, supra, note 27. The Motorola DynaTAC and MicroTAC were the first 
commercially available cell phones, costing about $10,000 and $6,000 respectively 
(adjusted for inflation), and offered thirty and ninety minutes of talk time. The DynaTAC 
was affectionately known as “The Brick” due to its size. See Nina Ruggiero, A Look Back 
at Cell Phones—Before the iPhone, AMNEWYORK (Mar. 9, 2015 11:56 AM), 
https://www.amny.com/lifestyle/cell-phones-through-the-years-1.7585422 [https://
perma.cc/2NGH-CRZE]; Cell Phone Cost Comparison Timeline, TECHNOLOGY.ORG (Sept. 
18, 2017), https://www.technology.org/2017/09/18/cell-phone-cost-comparison-timeline/ 
[https://perma.cc/HA2K-XMS5]. Another iconic phone from the time was affectionately 
known as the “Motorola Bag Phone,” because it was carried in a “fashionable leather bag 
[which] made it quite the catch.” See Motorola Bag Phone, TOTALLY 90S (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://totally-90s.com/motorola-bag-phone/ [https://perma.cc/59WD-QLUL]. 
 35 Paper Faxes were available but more expensive. Peter H. Lewis, Personal 
Computers: New Fax Machines: Getting More for Less, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 1989) 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/17/science/personal-computers-new-fax-machines-
getting-more-for-less.html [https://perma.cc/8K3N-ECC6]. 
 36 See Douglas C. Sicker, The End of Federalism in Telecommunication 
Regulations?, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 130, 134–35 (2005). 
 37 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 2 (1991). As an example, a cross-country call in 1980 
cost $0.71 for the first minute and $0.51, thereafter, FCC, STATISTICS OF 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS 196 (1980), https://www.fcc.gov/file/11642/
download [https://perma.cc/L9JP-6C4H], and by 1989 that price had fallen to $0.33 for 
the first minute and $0.32 thereafter during the day, and $0.175 per minute for the whole 
call during nights and weekends. 1989 Common Carriers Report, supra note 33, at 217. 
 38 See S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 2 (1991); see also, e.g., Josef Bernard, Picture 
Phone, RADIO-ELECTRONICS, Aug. 1982, at 43, http://www.americanradiohistory.com/Archive
-Radio-Electronics/80s/1982/Radio-Electronics-1982-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM9K-TFP4]. 
 39 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 2 (1991). 
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On the other side of the equation, while the technology used 
by telemarketers for placing calls was rapidly advancing, the 
technology used by consumers receiving calls was relatively 
stagnant. Indeed, much residential telephone service provided 
today is using then state-of-the-art technology that was being 
deployed in the late 1980s.40 
Importantly, in its initial 1992 order implementing the 
TCPA, the FCC considered alternative approaches to mitigating 
the harms of unwanted telephone calls, including ideas such as 
centralized do-not-call databases, directory markings indicating 
the classes of callers from which individuals consented to receive 
calls from, and technological solutions that could be implemented 
by consumers or within the telephone network to give consumers 
greater control over the calls that they received.41 All of these 
proposals were rejected as likely ineffective or because they were 
technologically or economically infeasible at the time.42 These are 
conclusions that may no longer hold—in particular, as will be seen 
below, the FCC and telecommunications industry are actively 
developing technologies to give consumers much greater control 
over the telephone calls that they receive. 
B. Implementation and Evolution of the TCPA 
The guiding principle of the TCPA is that telephone calls 
made with automatic telephone dialing systems or using 
prerecorded or artificial messages cannot be made without prior 
express consent.43 This general rule requiring prior express 
consent is subject to a few statutory exceptions, including that 
such calls can be made for emergency purposes and for the 
purposes of collection of debts on behalf of the government.44 Even 
more important, these rules are subject to implementation and 
interpretation by FCC rulemaking: the TCPA both directs the 
 
 40 See DAVID SIMPSON, FCC, CYBERSECURITY RISK REDUCTION 28 (2017), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-343096A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/95DC-
B84J] (noting that “the underlying SS7 protocol . . . has been used to set-up and tear-
down communications circuits since the 1980s.”) This report was rescinded shortly after 
adoption following a change in the FCC’s leadership, on the view of that new leadership 
that the FCC lacks statutory authority to regulate cybersecurity matters. See Public 
Safety & Homeland Security Bureau White Paper on Cybersecuirty Risk Reduction, 
Order, 32 FCC Rcd. 1107, 1107 (2017). 
 41 1992 TCPA Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2736, 2741 (1992). 
 42 Id. at 2741–42. 
 43 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 4 (1991); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 44 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)–(B) (including emergency exceptions); id. 
§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)–(b)(1)(B) (government debt collection exceptions). 
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FCC to make rules implementing the Act and expressly allows 
the FCC to exempt certain calls from the prohibition of the Act.45 
Callers who violate the Act can be subject to substantial 
civil and criminal fines. More important, the Act creates a strict 
liability private right of action under which individuals receiving 
calls in violation of the Act can recover statutory damages of 
$500 per call, an amount that can be tripled if a court finds that 
the violation of the law was willful.46 This has given rise to a 
cottage—but expensive—industry built around bringing class 
action lawsuits over TCPA violations.47 
Importantly, the Act draws a number of distinctions. For 
instance, it addresses all calls to cellular telephone services, or other 
telephone services for which the called party is charged for the call 
in one section,48 but it addresses calls to residential telephones to 
deliver a message as a separate category of calls in a separate 
section.49 It also directs the FCC to consider whether a given call 
includes unsolicited advertisements in implementing the Act, and 
thereby distinguishes between calls made merely to deliver 
informational messages and those made for commercial purposes.50 
The FCC first implemented its TCPA rules in its 1992 
TCPA Order.51 Under those rules, unsolicited commercial calls 
generally could not be made to residential telephones using 
automatic dialers or prerecorded or artificial voices without 
prior express consent.52 Informational calls were not subject to 
this requirement.53 All calls made to cellular phones (if the party 
was billed for the call) using automatic dialers or prerecorded or 
artificial voices, however, required prior express consent.54 
 
 45 Id. § 227(b)(1)(B)–(b)(2). 
 46 Id. § 227(c)(5). 
 47 See, e.g., Paul F. Corcoran, Marc J. Rachman & David S. Greenberg, The 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act: Privacy Legislation Gone Awry?, 26 INTELL. PROP. 
& TECH. L.J. no. 10, 2014, at 9, 13–14, http://www.dglaw.com/images_user/newsalerts/
113551.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JZ5-5DPS]; 2015 TCPA Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 8084 
(2015) (statement of Commissioner Mike O’Rielly) (“It has been reported that over [two 
thousand] TCPA class action lawsuits were filed in 2014 alone.”). 
 48 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 
 49 Id. § 227(b)(1)(B). 
 50 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (directing the FCC to consider whether a call 
includes the transmission of any unsolicited advertisement); id. § 227(a)(5) (defining 
“unsolicited advertisement”). 
 51 1992 TCPA Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752 (1992). 
 52 Id. at 8754 (“The TCPA, however, permits the Commission to exempt from 
the residential prohibition calls which are non-commercial and commercial calls which 
do not adversely affect the privacy rights of the called party and which do not transmit 
an unsolicited advertisement.”). 
 53 Id. at 8770–74. 
 54 Id. at 8775. 
12 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1 
In the years since, both the TCPA and the FCC’s rules 
implementing the TCPA have been modified several times.55 
Perhaps the most important development came in 2003 when 
Congress, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the FCC 
jointly implemented the National Do Not Call Registry.56 In 
implementing the Do Not Call Registry, the FTC adopted a stricter 
understanding of prior express consent than had previously 
governed: if an individual’s phone number was on the Do Not Call 
list, telemarketers could only call it if they had written prior 
express consent.57 In light of this requirement, the FCC followed 
suit, amending its rules to exempt firms calling phone numbers 
on the Do Not Call list from liability under the TCPA only if they 
had written prior express consent to make such calls.58 
Congress, the FTC, and the FCC have regularly updated 
this legal framework in response to changing marketing practices, 
judicial opinions, and market conditions.59 The most recent major 
FCC Order, the 2015 Omnibus TCPA Order, summarizes the 
current state of the FCC’s rules: 
The TCPA and the Commission’s implementing rules prohibit: (1) 
making telemarketing calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to 
residential telephones without prior express consent; and (2) making 
any non-emergency call using an automatic telephone dialing system 
(“autodialer”) or an artificial or prerecorded voice to a wireless telephone 
number without prior express consent. If the call includes or introduces 
an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing, consent must be in 
writing. If an autodialed or prerecorded call to a wireless number is not 
for such purposes, the consent may be oral or written.60 
C. First Amendment Doctrine 
The TCPA is government regulation of speech. As discussed 
above, it places restrictions on how certain types of speech are 
communicated, including imposing significant fines upon those 
who engage in the prohibited forms of speech. An understanding of 
First Amendment doctrine is therefore needed prior to discussing 
the TCPA—particularly given that First Amendment doctrine 
has continued to evolve since the TCPA was first enacted. 
 
 55 See supra note 10. 
 56 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (2003) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (2012)). 
 57 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i) (2018). 
 58 2003 TCPA Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14043 (2003) (“Consistent with the 
FTC’s determination, we conclude that for purposes of the national do-not-call list such 
express permission must be evidenced only by a signed, written agreement . . . .”). 
 59 See supra note 10. 
 60 2015 TCPA Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7967–68 (2015) (emphasis in original). 
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The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making 
any law abridging the freedom of speech.61 This does not, however, 
prohibit any law that merely has the effect of abridging speech. 
To the contrary, the law routinely abridges speech. The canonical 
example demonstrates the point: the law can prohibit “falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre.”62 We have laws against defamation, 
libel, perjury; laws limiting disclosure of trade secrets and 
dictating the terms of whistleblowing; laws governing the use and 
copying of various works of authorship; laws governing what can 
and cannot be said on broadcast television and radio; laws 
limiting when, where, and how protests and other forms of public 
speech occur; and many other examples.63 
Instead, courts evaluate the nature and extent of a law’s 
effect on speech and then weigh those factors against the law’s 
purpose and means of implementation.64 The most common 
dichotomy in this framework is between laws that are content-
neutral and those that are content-based. “Content-based laws—
those that target speech based on its communicative content—
are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if 
the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve 
compelling state interests.”65 This “narrowly tailored to serve 
compelling state interests” standard is known as strict 
scrutiny.66 Content-neutral laws on the other hand—generally 
“those that are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech”67—are subject to a less intense intermediate 
scrutiny requiring that the restrictions on speech be narrowly 
 
 61 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 62 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). This example, while 
canonical, is not precisely correct. The Supreme Court overturned Schenck in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), holding that 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a 
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action. 
Regardless, the point remains: even in the case of advocacy—pure political speech that lies at 
the core of the First Amendment—there are circumstances where speech can be abridged. 
 63 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (fair use exception to copyright law); 47 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C)(ii)(1) (2012) (providing penalties for “broadcast [of] obscene, 
indecent, or profane language”); MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2017) (whistleblower statute); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.61 (West 2018) (Ohio Trade Secrets Act); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 4902 (2018) (criminalizing perjury); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 
(West 2017) (elements of libel in a civil action); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-404–409 (West 
2018) (statutes placing limitations on protests or assembly); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-504 
(West 2018) (statute criminalizing defamation). 
 64 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). 
 65 Id. at 2226. 
 66 Id. at 2226–27. 
 67 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (citations omitted). 
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tailored to serve some important or substantial government 
interest.68 Commercial speech has historically been evaluated 
under a third analytical framework, albeit one that is similar to 
the intermediate scrutiny standard—though the Court’s recent 
cases call the ongoing vitality of this so-called commercial speech 
doctrine into question.69 
Under the traditional approach, courts have generally 
evaluated laws regulating commercial speech using the four-
part Central Hudson test.70 The premise of this test, and the 
constitutional justification for regulating commercial speech in 
general, is that such speech is more closely akin to economic 
activity than it is to substantive speech.71 The government has 
broad authority to regulate economic activity, and so—the 
theory goes—it has greater authority over commercial speech 
than over other forms of speech. Under the Central Hudson test, 
courts look to four criteria: (1) whether the speech is misleading 
or related to unlawful activity; (2) whether the restriction serves 
a substantial government interest; (3) whether the restriction 
directly advances that interest; and (4) whether the regulation 
is more extensive than necessary to advance the government 
interest.72 Although this test is relatively forgiving compared to 
those tests evaluating other government regulation of speech, 
courts nonetheless regularly find that government regulation of 
commercial speech violates the First Amendment.73 
Content-neutral regulation of noncommercial speech is 
evaluated under an intermediate scrutiny standard.74 This 
standard, which is similar to the Central Hudson test,75 is most 
commonly applied to “time, place, and manner” restrictions on 
 
 68 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Note that “narrowly tailored” has different meanings 
in the contexts of strict and intermediate scrutiny. Compare Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 
(“[R]egulation of . . . protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the 
government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests, but that it need not be the least 
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”), with United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 
709, 729 (2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) 
(“[W]hen the Government seeks to regulate protected speech, the restriction must be the 
‘least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.’”). 
 69 See infra Section II.C. 
 70 Cent. Hudson Gas Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980). 
 71 Id. at 563. 
 72 Id. at 566. 
 73 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New Ground: A Response 
to the Supreme Court’s Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 389, 391 (2012) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has not upheld a commercial speech 
restriction since 1995.”). 
 74 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989). 
 75 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. 
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speech. It requires that such “restrictions are ‘justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.’”76 The key factors under both 
the Central Hudson test and intermediate scrutiny are whether the 
regulation in question serves a significant government interest and 
whether it is narrowly tailored to accomplish that goal. 
The highest form of First Amendment scrutiny, strict 
scrutiny, is reserved for content-based regulation of speech.77 A 
law that treats speakers differently based upon the message 
being conveyed will generally trigger strict scrutiny.78 Under 
this standard of review, a law must be “narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling government interest,”79 in “the least 
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”80 This 
standard is harder to meet than that of intermediate scrutiny or 
of that applied to commercial speech.81 A compelling government 
interest is “an interest of the highest order,” one that is more 
substantial than merely a significant interest.82 Because the 
regulatory restriction must be implemented using the least 
restrictive means, it is not sufficient merely to leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication: the regulation must 
implement the channel of communication that is least restrictive 
of speech from among any alternatives. 
The application of strict scrutiny to laws that 
differentiate based upon the content of messages explains the 
importance of the Central Hudson test: if the Court in Central 
Hudson had not decided that regulation of commercial speech is 
more akin to economic regulation than to speech regulation, 
 
 76 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 
(2017) (“In order to survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be ‘narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest.’” (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518, 2534 (2014))). 
 77 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2236 (2015) (Kagan, J. concurring). 
 78 See infra note 166 (discussing Reed). 
 79 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232 (majority opinion). 
 80 Sable Commc’ns. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
 81 This is captured in the quip that strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal 
in fact,” a phrase attributed to Gerald Gunther. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); see also United States v. 
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to strict scrutiny as 
“near-automatic condemnation”). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in 
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
793, 795 (2006) (showing that “strict scrutiny is far from the inevitably deadly test 
imagined by the Gunther myth”). 
 82 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U. S. 
765, 780 (2002)). 
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regulation of commercial speech would necessarily be content-
based. This would have brought a wide range of speech 
regulation under the umbrella of strict scrutiny—increasing the 
likelihood that much of it may be invalidated. 
One way we think about whether a law is narrowly tailored 
is to consider whether it is under or overinclusive. Underinclusive 
regulations are particularly suspect, “[b]ecause a ‘law cannot be 
regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as 
justifying a restriction on truthful speech, when it leaves 
appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest 
unprohibited.’”83 Nor can the restriction be overinclusive, meaning 
that it cannot “‘unnecessarily circumscribe protected expression.’”84 
As explained by the Supreme Court, “[i]t is well established that, 
as a general rule, the Government ‘may not suppress lawful speech 
as the means to suppress unlawful speech.’”85 
D. The TCPA and the First Amendment: Early 
Consideration 
Since the TCPA was first adopted by Congress, it has been 
understood that, as a regulation of speech, it raises potential First 
Amendment issues.86 These issues were discussed both by 
Congress at the time of adoption and recognized by the FCC in its 
first Report and Order implementing rules for the TCPA.87 
Shortly before the law went into effect, the first of several 
 
 83 Id. (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)); see also 
Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541–42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also, e.g., 
Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011); Greater New Orleans Broad. 
Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 189–90 (1999) (legislation banning advertisements 
for private casino gambling, but not other types of gambling, was not even rationally 
related to the state’s interest in reducing gambling); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 756 (1996) (law requiring cable operators to block 
sexual material on leased channels, but not on unleased channels, was underinclusive 
and not sufficiently tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest in protecting 
children); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 479, 489 (1995) (ban on alcohol 
content labels that applied to beer but not to wine and spirits failed to “directly and 
materially advance its aim” of averting “strength wars” among alcohol producers); City 
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 (1993). 
 84 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775, 780 (2002) (quoting 
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982)). 
 85 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002)). 
 86 See S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 4 (1991). 
 87 Id.; see also 1992 TCPA Order, 7 FCC Rcd., 2736, 2737 n.9 (1992) (citing 
Congress’s finding, as stated in the TCPA, that “the Federal Communications 
Commission should have the flexibility to design different rules [under the TCPA] 
consistent with the free speech protections embodied in the First Amendment of the 
Constitution.”). See generally 1992 TCPA Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752 (1992) (discussing 
“commercial freedom of speech” throughout). 
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challenges to the TCPA on First Amendment grounds—Moser v. 
FCC—was filed.88 
The FCC’s First Amendment analysis in its Report and 
Order was straightforward, if brief, and contained three basic 
arguments. First, that the TCPA is content-neutral regulation, 
and that as such reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions—such as the Report asserts the TCPA to be—are 
permissible.89 This point will be returned to below, as well as 
throughout the rest of this article, as it is of central importance. 
Second, the Report noted that “in the privacy of the home . . . the 
individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder”—another critical point that 
will also be returned to, in Part III, below.90 Generally, given the 
technology in use in the early 1990s, this likely was a 
reasonable conclusion; but in today’s technological setting it is 
a more problematic basis for speech regulation. And third, the 
Report made an important distinction that there is a difference 
between prerecorded phone calls and those made by a “live” 
operator.91 As with the previous point, this argument likely had 
significant valence in the 1990s, but may have less today. 
Perhaps more important is the recognition by Congress that 
there is a meaningful difference between prerecorded and live 
calls—one that may suggest previously unconsidered First 
Amendment problems.92 
In its first Report and Order implementing the TCPA, the 
FCC’s First Amendment analysis could be called implicit. 
Drawing from the text of the TCPA, the FCC recognized that 
Congress had felt that the Commission “should have the 
flexibility to design different rules [under the TCPA] consistent 
with the free speech protections embodied in the First 
Amendment of the Constitution.”93 The Report and Order 
recognizes that “[i]ndividuals’ privacy rights, public safety 
interests, and commercial freedom of speech and trade must be 
balanced in a way that protects the privacy of individuals and 
 
 88 Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995). Other often-cited cases 
challenging the TCPA on First Amendment grounds include: Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald 
Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2014), aff ’ d on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016)); 
Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1545 (8th Cir. 1995); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. 
Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 920, 927 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
 89 S. REP NO. 102-178, at 4. 
 90 Id. (alteration in original) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 
(1978)); see also infra Part III (discussion of the sanctuary of the home). 
 91 S. REP NO. 102-178, at 4–5. 
 92 See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 93 In re Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 2736, 2737 n.9 (1992) (quoting Telephone Consumer Protection. 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(13), 105 Stat. 2394, 2395 (1991)). 
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permits legitimate telemarketing practices.”94 Beyond 
recognizing these general concerns, the FCC does not engage in 
any substantive First Amendment analysis—indeed, it does not 
even directly mention the First Amendment in its Report and 
Order. The Report and Order nonetheless contains significant 
analysis that is relevant to the First Amendment, focusing on 
various alternative means to implement the requirements of the 
TCPA before ultimately adopting rules largely similar to those 
in place in 2018.95 Alternatives included the use of nationwide 
do not call databases, industry or firm-specific do not call 
databases, time of day restrictions, and network-level 
technological solutions to give telephone users greater control 
over which calls they want to receive. These alternatives were 
rejected as being—at the time—technologically infeasible or too 
costly to implement, and the 1992 Report and Order instead 
settled on requiring individual companies to maintain and 
manage their own lists of numbers not to call.96 
The first legal challenge to the TCPA, Moser, was filed by 
the National Association of Telecomputer Operators, a 
telemarketing trade group, shortly after the FCC’s rules were 
adopted and shortly before the TCPA went into effect.97 The 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon disagreed 
with Congress’s analysis that the TCPA is content-neutral, 
explaining that 
This court concludes that the TCPA is a content-based regulation, and 
cannot be justified as a legitimate time, place or manner restriction 
on protected speech. The statute draws distinctions between the 
manner in which some speech is delivered (recorded versus live), but 
also distinguishes between messages on the basis of content 
(commercial versus noncommercial). Moreover, the government’s 
purpose behind legislating the TCPA’s speech restrictions is 
necessarily related to the content of the prerecorded messages; the 
statute restricts some speakers because the content of their messages 
(prerecorded commercial solicitations) is believed to be more invasive 
of residential privacy than the prerecorded speech of others 
(noncommercial solicitors).98 
 
 94 1992 TCPA Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752, 8754 (1992) (quoting Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(9), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (1991). 
 95 See id. at 8756–68. 
 96 Id. at 8757–68. 
 97 Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 972–73 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 98 Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Or. 1993), rev’d, 46 F.3d 970 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
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Following this analysis, the district court applied the 
Central Hudson test and concluded that the TCPA failed to 
advance sufficient interests and was therefore unconstitutional.99 
This opinion was appealed to and overturned by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.100 The 
circuit court’s opinion was brief, bordering on cursory. It began by 
noting that the underlying challenge was narrow, focusing solely 
on the statute and not the FCC’s rules implementing it.101 It then 
noted that the district court had analyzed the case subject to 
Central Hudson. But from there, the circuit court stated that the 
statute itself did not distinguish between commercial and 
noncommercial speech—it only authorized the FCC to make such 
a distinction in its implementation of the statute—and held from 
that observation in a conclusory way that “[b]ecause nothing in 
the statute requires the Commission to distinguish between 
commercial and noncommercial speech, we conclude that the 
statute should be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, and 
manner restriction.”102 The court neither considered the other 
ways in which the district court said the TCPA makes content-
based distinctions, nor offered any analysis of whether the TCPA 
makes content-based distinctions on its own. 
From here, the Ninth Circuit conducted an intermediate 
scrutiny analysis of whether the TCPA is a permissible content-
neutral regulation of speech, asking “whether a ban on 
automated telemarketing calls is narrowly tailored to the 
residential privacy interest, and whether ample alternative 
channels of communication remain open.”103 The court found 
that it is. Its principal findings were that Congress has a 
significant interest in residential privacy (noting that 
petitioners had not contested this), that the underinclusiveness 
of the statute—that the TCPA did not prohibit all calls that 
encroached upon this privacy interest—was not fatal to the 
TCPA, and that Congress had considered alternative, less 
restrictive means of regulation.104 Of these considerations, the 
second is most important for purposes of the present discussion. 
Drawing on Supreme Court precedent that held underinclusive 
regulations are problematic “only when a regulation represents 
an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an 
advantage in expressing its views to the people,” the court found 
 
 99 Id. at 364–67. 
 100 Moser, 46 F.3d at 970 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 101 Id. at 973. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 974. 
 104 Id. at 974–75. 
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that any underinclusiveness in the TCPA was not a problem 
because “[t]he ban on automated, prerecorded calls is not an 
attempt to favor a particular viewpoint.”105 But, as discussed 
below, this is a confused understanding of the law. Indeed, it is 
a misstatement of the precedent cited by the Ninth Circuit—the 
court’s opinion says that a regulation is underinclusive only 
when it is an attempt to give advantage to one side of a debate, 
but the supporting case says merely that such an attempt may 
constitute underinclusiveness.106 
Regardless, the Moser court’s opinion stands and is 
perhaps the bedrock opinion on which subsequent First 
Amendment analysis of the TCPA has been built. Subsequent 
opinions, until recently, have found that the TCPA is a 
permissible content-neutral regulation of commercial speech 
(where the FCC regulations have been under consideration) 
subject to either intermediate scrutiny or Central Hudson 
analysis of regulation of commercial speech.107 
Two cases in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit are of interest, in addition to the Ninth Circuit’s 
Moser opinion: Van Bergen v. State of Minnesota (1995) and 
Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax (2003). Van Bergen 
related to a state-law equivalent to the TCPA—Minnesota’s 
1987 law that banned the use of autodialers and prerecorded 
messages.108 Van Bergen, a candidate for state governor who 
intended to use autodialers to make campaign calls, challenged 
the Minnesota law on the grounds that interfered with 
constitutionally-protected political speech.109 The Eighth Circuit 
disagreed, holding that the state law was content-neutral and a 
permissible time, place, manner restriction.110 This opinion is 
notable in part because it makes that holding in the context of 
pure political speech; it is also notable (and most often cited) for 
its holding (unrelated to this article) that the TCPA does not 
preempt, and is indeed complementary to, state laws regulating 
 
 105 Id. at 974 (citations omitted). 
 106 Compare id. (stating that “‘underinclusiveness’ may be the basis of a First 
Amendment violation only when a regulation represents an ‘attempt to give one side of a 
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people.’”(emphasis 
added) (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994))), with City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 
512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) (stating merely that “an exemption from an otherwise permissible 
regulation of speech may represent a governmental ‘attempt to give one side of a debatable 
public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785–86 (1978))). 
 107 See, e.g., Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc., 729 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 108 Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1545 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 109 Id. at 1546. 
 110 Id. at 1551. 
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the use of autodialers.111 The opinion is also noteworthy for its 
discussion of the underlying technology of how autodialed phone 
calls are made, noting differences in how individuals are able to 
interact with live callers versus prerecorded messages.112 In 
particular, it discusses the difference between contexts like door-
to-door solicitations and unwanted postal mail and how giving 
individual homeowners the ability to indicate whether they were 
willing to receive such materials is a better way to preserve their 
privacy interests.113 As recognized by the Van Bergen court, as 
well as by the FCC in its 1992 TCPA Report and Order, such 
technologies were not available at the time.114 But, by implication 
and as discussed below, that is no longer, or need not be any 
longer, the case today.115 
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Missouri ex rel. Nixon is 
a third canonical case in the genre of First Amendment 
challenges to the TCPA. This case, relating to the sending of 
“junk faxes” under the TCPA was heard in the early 2000s, 
during a period of rapid technological change.116 It is notable 
largely because the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri found the TCPA’s prohibition on junk faxes 
problematic on First Amendment grounds and the Eighth 
Circuit subsequently reversed.117 As an initial matter, it is 
critical to note that the district court did not substantially 
consider the level of scrutiny applicable to the TCPA—rather, 
the judge noted in a footnote that “[a]dvertisements by definition 
qualify as commercial speech,” and that “the Central Hudson 
test was the proper standard to be used in this cause of action to 
analyze the restrictions on commercial speech.”118 On appeal, 
“[t]he parties agree[d] that the fax advertisements in question 
[were] commercial speech,” and the court consequently applied 
Central Hudson without further analysis about the relevant 
standard of review.119 More generally, the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion is notable for its emphasis and reliance on unsolicited 
 
 111 Id. at 1548. 
 112 Id. at 1554–56. 
 113 Id. at 1554–55. 
 114 Id. at 1554; see also 1992 TCPA Order, 7 FCC Rcd 8752, 8761–62 (1992). 
 115 See infra Part III (arguing that in large part FCC regulations themselves have 
prevented the development of such technologies and that protecting privacy interests such 
as the sanctuary of the home is better facilitated by promoting technologies that facilitate 
low transaction cost bargaining between calling and called parties). 
 116 Larry Magid, The Decade in Technology, CBS NEWS (Dec. 28, 2009, 11:45 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-decade-in-technology/ [https://perma.cc/62LJ-8CUA]. 
 117 Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 920, 934 (E.D. 
Mo. 2002), rev’d, 323 F.3d 649, 660 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 118 Id. at 927 n.16. 
 119 Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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commercial faxes’ status as commercial speech.120 Indeed, it is 
notable that in discussing the government’s interest in 
regulating the transmission of junk faxes under the TCPA, 
neither the district court nor the circuit court recognize privacy 
interests as a basis for regulation. Rather, the governmental 
interests asserted are solely economic—the material costs 
incurred by printing to fax paper and the disruption owners of 
fax machines experience in their own ability to use the machines 
while they are receiving unwanted faxes.121 While these interests 
may be sufficient for the regulation of commercial speech under 
a Central Hudson-style intermediate scrutiny analysis, as 
discussed below it is unclear how they would be considered 
under a more contemporary analysis.122 
These three cases—Moser, Van Berger, and Missouri ex 
rel. Nixon—are canonical examples of how courts have treated 
the TCPA under the First Amendment. But, while their analysis 
was at the time reasonably sound, albeit with some imperfection, 
they were also situated in a particular technological and legal 
context. In the intervening years—especially since Moser—much 
has changed on both fronts. 
II. HOW THE TIMES HAVE CHANGED 
The discussion above explains that the TCPA was written 
in the era of analog technology and landline telephones; it was 
written to address problems of phone calls disrupting family 
dinners and filling up tapes on answering machines; it was 
written to provide basic rules of the road for a new form of 
communication that was proving problematic. Not even a law 
review editor would demand a citation for the proposition that 
things have changed a great deal since 1991.123 A number of 
these changes are important to a modern understanding of the 
constitutionality of the TCPA. 
A. The Problem Has Changed 
At the time the TCPA was adopted, “the [FCC] received 
over 2,300 complaints about telemarketing calls [per] year.”124 
Today, robocalls are the most common subject of consumer 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 655; see also Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d at 928–29. 
 122 See infra Part III. 
 123 At the suggestion of the editors, see Rueben Fischer-Baum, What ‘Tech 
World’ Did You Grow Up In?, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/graphics/2017/entertainment/tech-generations [https://perma.cc/438B-SVNX]. 
 124 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991). 
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complaints received by the FCC or the FTC. More than 200,000 of 
the 475,000 complaints that the FCC received in 2016 were about 
robocalls.125 The FTC maintains the Do Not Call Registry, so it 
receives a larger portion of complaints about robocalls: more than 
five million complaints in 2016.126 These complaints reflect just a 
small portion of the problem as evidenced by the estimate of 4.1 
billion calls in violation of the TCPA and Do Not Call Registry 
made in May 2018 alone (and more in subsequent months).127 
More important than the increase in volume of calls, the 
nature of the calls that generate these complaints has changed 
substantially over the past decades. When the TCPA was 
enacted, it was in response to the advent of autodialers and 
prerecorded messages.128 When these technologies appeared, 
there were no norms governing how they should be used, no laws 
to enforce those norms, and indeed no recognition that they were 
peculiarly problematic for consumers. Rather, they were an 
extension of preexisting telemarketing or informational calling 
campaigns. Instead of paying twenty people to make one 
thousand calls in a day, a single machine could be used to make 
one thousand calls in the same amount of time.129 It was merely 
a cheaper, more efficient way of reaching people on the phone. 
Indeed, this was central to the technology’s effectiveness: 
because people were unaccustomed to receiving many calls in 
the evening, they routinely answered whatever calls they 
received. This made these calls both particularly effective and 
also particularly problematic: they worked because they could 
 
 125 See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Acts to Confront ‘IRS Debt’ 
Scam Robocalls & Malicious Caller-Id Spoofing (Mar. 23, 2017), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
attachments/DOC-344034A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H39N-7YQ3]; CGB—Consumer 
Complaints Data, FCC – Open Data, https://opendata.fcc.gov/Consumer/CGB-Consumer-
Complaints-by-Category/xaun-e99e [https://perma.cc/8QEN-FKCN]. 
 126 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Releases FY 2017 National Do Not 
Call Registry Data Book and DNC Mini Site (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2017/12/ftc-releases-fy-2017-national-do-not-call-registry-data-
book-dnc [https://perma.cc/6ZPJ-RS77]. 
 127 FED. TRADE COMM’N ROBOCALL STRIKE FORCE REP. 1 (2016), 
https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/Robocall-Strike-Force-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V9S3-E5TG]; see also PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R45070, 
PROTECTING CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES FROM FRAUDULENT ROBOCALLS 3, 16 (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45070.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NU8-8FPL]; Robocall Index, 
YOUMAIL ROBOCALL INDEX https://robocallindex.com/2018/september [https://perma.cc/
P9NS-EGJT] (indicating 4.4 billion robocalls placed in September 2018). 
 128 See supra Section I.A. 
 129 Compare Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, S. 1462, 102d Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 2(3) (1991), as reported in 137 CONG. REC. H11, 307-01 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) 
(300,000 solicitors making 18 million calls daily), with 137 CONG. REC. E793 (daily ed. Mar. 
6, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey) (180,000 solicitors making 7,000,000 calls daily). 
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take advantage of people’s trust that when the phone rang there 
was someone on the other end who they wanted to talk to.130 
In the years since adoption of the TCPA, largely in 
response to the TCPA as well as with the advent of the Do Not 
Call Registry and technologies like Caller ID, clear frameworks 
have developed to guide the legitimate use of autodialers and 
prerecorded messages.131 Many firms—especially those seeking to 
do legitimate business with willing customers—try to follow these 
frameworks.132 There are plenty of legitimate uses for these 
technologies, such as sending out text messages reminding people 
about prescriptions or bill payments, making it easy for individuals 
to request that information or commercial opportunities be sent to 
them, or facilitating the use of efficient dialing technologies when 
trying to contact customers. 
There have been several examples of pro-consumer 
business practices that have been caught in the net of TCPA 
litigation in recent years. One of the driving factors behind this 
litigation trend is that the statutory damages provision of the 
TCPA, allowing a minimum award of $500 per call, operates as a 
significant damages multiplier in the context of class action 
litigation. Backed by these statutory damages, even small classes 
can expose companies using telephones to communicate with their 
customers to millions of dollars in potential liability. Faced with 
such large potential liability, few defendants in TCPA cases choose 
to litigate past motions to dismiss, instead settling any charges to 
avoid exposure to the full brunt of statutory damages.133 
 
 130 137 CONG REC. H11,307 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (300,000 solicitors making 
18 million calls); 137 CONG. REC. H11,312 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (Statement of Rep. 
Cooper) (“Unwanted calls are tainting the wanted ones and make us cringe at the 
thought of answering the telephone at night.”); 137 CONG REC. E793 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 
1992) (Statement of Rep. Markey) (“The telephone is an insistent master—when it rings, 
we answer it—and many consumers complain bitterly that, when it rings to deliver 
unsolicited advertising, it is invading their privacy.”). 
 131 Waller et al., supra note 11, at 374–80. 
 132 Id. at 374–89. 
 133 See Corcoran et al., supra note 47, at 9; see also Monica Desai, et al., A TCPA 
for the 21st Century: Why TCPA Lawsuits Are on the Rise and What the FCC Should Do 
About It, 8 INT’L J. MOBILE MARKETING 75, 75–76 (2013) https://www.mmaglobal.com/
files/vol8no1/vol8no1-6.pdf (“The TCPA has become fertile ground for nuisance lawsuits 
because class action lawyers are often rewarded with quick settlements, even in cases 
without any merit, simply because litigation uncertainty and the potential financial 
exposure resulting from a bad decision are too great a risk for a company to bear.”); U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COM. INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, TCPA LITIGATION SPRAWL: A STUDY OF THE 
SOURCES AND TARGETS OF RECENT TCPA LAWSUITS (2017) (discussing the dramatic 
increase in TCPA litigation in recent years and noting that “Forty-four law firms are the 
primary filers of over eighteen hundred (1,826) of all the TCPA cases examined 
(approximately 60%).”) https://www.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Media/PDF/Newsletters/
TCPA%20Connect/US-Chamber-TCPA-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2CL-F72D]. 
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One common class of examples is captured by suits 
against sports venues that allow spectators to send a text 
message, which may appear on the venue’s “jumbotron.” A 
number of venues have faced significant TCPA exposure because 
they would send texts back to the spectator to confirming receipt 
of the initial message, potentially in violation of the TCPA’s 
requirement that communications to wireless phones have 
express prior written consent.134 More generally, the sending 
automatic text messages to confirm receipt of a message has 
been a regular target of TCPA class action litigation.135 
As another example, pharmacies have faced TCPA 
exposure for sending patients reminders to refill their 
prescriptions—reminders that can literally be lifesaving.136 And 
cooperative community banks have faced exposure under the 
TCPA for calling their member-customers—as co-ops, such banks 
are effectively being sued by themselves for attempting to call 
themselves.137 And larger businesses have struggled to develop 
TCPA-compliant ways to communicate at scale with their 
customers for legitimate business purposes, such as in a recently-
filed case against Wells Fargo.138 
 
 134 See, e.g., Complaint at 4–6, Friedman v. LAC Basketball Club, Inc., No. 2:13-
cv-00818-CBM-AN (C.D. Cal. dismissed July 8, 2014); Wojcik v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., No. 
8:12-CV-2414-T-23TBM, 2014 WL 11332303, (M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2014); Emanuel v. The 
Los Angeles Lakers, Inc., No. CV 12-9936-GW(SHx), 2013 WL 1719035, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 
18, 2013). None of these cases resulted in a final judgment against the defendant. 
Emanuel bucked the trend and ultimately resulted in a dismissal of the case with 
prejudice after the judge found that consumers sending an initial text to the venue 
implied consent to receive a response. The other cases resulted in settlements. 
 135 See cases cited supra note 134. 
 136 See Lowe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 3d 636 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Complaint, 
Rooney v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 3:14-CV-01249-JAH-NLS (S.D. Cal. dismissed Apr. 15, 2015), 
https://www.classaction.org/media/rooney-v-rite-aid.pdf. [https://perma.cc/RHM3-9WY2] 
 137 See Letter from Major L. Clark, Acting Chief Counsel, Office of Advocacy, 
and Jamie Belcore Saloom, Counsel, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., to Marlene S. Dortch, 
Sec’y, FCC (Aug. 1, 2018), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10801393021926/SBA%20Ex%20
Parte_08_01_18.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9JL-2J4Z] (discussing conversations that the 
SBA conducted with “small credit unions, financial service providers, healthcare service 
providers, and banks regarding their concerns about TCPA compliance” and noting that 
“[r]ecent litigation has created uncertainty over what types of technology can be used to 
contact customers without running afoul of the TCPA.”); see also Letter from Jim Nussle, 
President & CEO, Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n, to the House Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. 
on the Constitution and Civil Justice (June 13, 2017), https://www.cuna.org/uploaded
Files/Advocacy/Actions/Comment_Calls,_Letters_and_Testimonies/2017/Letters/TCPA%2
0Judiciary%20letter%2020170613(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/4JZ5-5DPS]; see also Kristian 
Stout, The TCPA is a Costly Technological Anachronism, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (June 15, 
2015), https://truthonthemarket.com/2015/06/15/the-tcpa-is-a-costly-technological-anachro
nism [https://perma.cc/G9WW-QWUC] (discussing PayPal). 
 138 See, e.g., Dena Aubin, Wells Fargo Hit with Lawsuit over Robocalls to Wrong 
Numbers, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-robo
calls-lawsuit/wells-fargo-hit-with-lawsuit-over-robocalls-to-wrong-numbers-idUSKCN1N0
2FG [https://perma.cc/VK5Z-JR97]. 
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Such examples may seem trivial to some (putting to the 
side that potential statutory damages in such cases can easily 
reach tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars), especially 
when compared to overwhelming disapproval of robocalls. But 
most constitutionally-protected speech is mundane—most speech 
is not the Pentagon Papers139 or unpopular political speech. But 
the question asked under the First Amendment is not whether 
speech is good enough to warrant protection. Quite the contrary, 
a core function of the First Amendment is precisely to keep the 
government out of determining what speech is “good”—that is, 
what speech is permissible or merits protection.140 Rather, the 
inquiry is whether certain types of speech are so problematic that 
they bear exception to the general rule that all speech is 
protected, no matter how trivial or unmeritorious it may seem. 
Of course, not everyone using autodialers is engaged in 
“good” (or “not bad”) speech. Some bad-faith callers engage in 
scams, trying to trick unsuspecting individuals into giving up 
sensitive personal or financial information.141 Others use 
autodialers to harvest phone numbers for individuals who are 
likely to answer their phones, so that they can be contacted later 
(typically by a scam artist) or have their numbers sold.142 Still other 
recent scams have attempted to trick the called party into saying 
words or phrases that can then be used for identity or financial 
fraud.143 These calls frequently use technologies that allow them to 
“spoof ”  Caller ID, to hide their illegitimate identity or to make it 
look like they are coming from a legitimate phone number.144 And 
many of these calls are made by “lead generation” firms that place 
 
 139 Niraj Chokshi, Behind the Race to Publish the Top-Secret Pentagon Papers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/pentagon-papers-
post.html [https://perma.cc/N3PT-GW7B]. 
 140 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015) (explaining that 
regardless of the “innocent motives . . . [of] a facially content-based statute,” the First 
Amendment prevents “future government officials [from] wield[ing] such statutes to 
suppress disfavored speech.”); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438–39 (1963) (rejecting 
the State’s assertion that its interest in regulating professional conduct by outlawing 
litigation based speech of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People is consistent with the First Amendment). 
 141 See FTC v. Glob. Mktg. Grp., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284–85 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
 142 See, e.g., Aarti Shahani, Why Phone Fraud Starts with a Silent Call, NPR 
(Aug. 24, 2015, 4:35 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/08/24/
434313813/why-phone-fraud-starts-with-a-silent-call [https://perma.cc/4MBM-WGMD] 
(describing the common process by which scammers receive phone numbers and other 
personal information). 
 143 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumer Alert: ‘Can You Hear Me’ 
Scams Phone Fraudsters Recording Consumers’ Voice Responses (Mar. 27, 2017), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-344083A1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B3FQ-JTEJ]. 
 144 See Spoofing and Caller ID, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/
spoofing-and-caller-id [https://perma.cc/83KK-SWEH]. 
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calls on behalf of third parties, using call forwarding to redirect 
positive leads to a live operator at the contracting firm.145 
These modern uses of autodialers are fundamentally 
different from their use by legitimate businesses. As an initial 
matter, legitimate businesses have reputational concerns and 
want to maintain positive relationships with their (prospective 
and, especially, existing) customers. Those making illegitimate 
uses of autodialers generally do not have these concerns: they 
are engaged in scams or are faceless middlemen. They have no 
reputation to lose because they have no identity: they use fake 
phone numbers that provide no identifying information in their 
calls. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals or 
law enforcement to take action against these callers. 
Reassignment of telephone numbers, and of wireless phone 
numbers in particular, is another relatively recent but challenging 
problem.146 At the time of the TCPA’s enactment, there were 
roughly 96.4 million retail subscribers in the United States, less 
than 0.5 numbers per person in the country.147 As of the end of 
2016, there were over 460 million numbers in service, or about 1.5 
numbers per person in the country.148 This increase has put a 
dramatic strain on the supply of phone numbers.149 The vast 
majority of these new numbers have been assigned to wireless 
phones—and they are being assigned at a rate far in excess of that 
at which new (unused) numbers are being released. As a result, 
 
 145 See., e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Crackdown 
on Two Massive Illegal Robocall Operations (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
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 146 Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Second 
Notice of Inquiry, 32 FCC Rcd 6007, 6009 (2017). 
 147 See FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, AT 12-4, 17-3 (2001), https://
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 149 See ED ROSENBERG, NAT’L REGULATORY RES. INST., WHY THE SKY DID NOT 
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NUMBERING RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION 7 (2002) http://ipu.msu.edu/wp-content/uploads/
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see also Waller et al., supra note 11, at 365–66. 
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approximately thirty-five million wireless telephones are reported 
to receive reassigned numbers every year.150 
Number reassignment is difficult for the TCPA because 
consent to be called does not transfer with the telephone number 
and therefore callers have only limited ability to know whether a 
given phone number has been reassigned.151 Every call that a 
caller makes, therefore, is potentially to a number that has been 
reassigned to a non-consenting party, and therefore might 
technically violate the TCPA. The FCC attempted to address this 
issue in its 2015 TCPA Order by creating a single-call safe harbor: 
if a calling party does not receive affirmative consent upon 
making a call, it will not face TCPA liability for the call but must 
assume that the number has been reassigned and discontinue 
calling it in the future.152 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit has recently set aside the single-
call safe harbor as arbitrary and capricious.153 
B. The Technology Has Changed 
There is perhaps no adverb in the English language to 
adequately capture how dramatically the technology of phone 
calls has changed since 1991. The FCC rules allowing telephone 
carriers to provide Caller ID services to customers were not 
adopted until 1995.154 One of the major concerns animating the 
TCPA was that autodialed phone calls would not recognize when 
a call was answered by an answering machine, so they would fill 
entire answering machine tapes. Autodialers today are much 
better at determining when a human is not on the other end of a 
call; and, of course, the use of answering machines or audio 
cassettes to record messages has largely been displaced by 
centrally-stored voicemail services. 
From the consumer perspective, the biggest change is, of 
course, the rise of the cell phone. In 1991 cell phones were 
exceptionally rare—and expensive.155 Typically, consumers 
 
 150 See Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Second 
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Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 11700, 11705 ¶ 12 (1995). 
 155 See Jim Gustke, Cell Phone Cost Comparison Timeline, OOMA BLOG (Aug. 22, 
2017), https://www.ooma.com/blog/cell-phone-cost-comparison [https://perma.cc/FWC2-FUCL]. 
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connected to the telephone network via a single telephone line 
connected to their house, which would in turn be connected to a 
number of wired telephones.156 That line was shared between the 
house, and any phone call would cause each of those telephones to 
ring. Today, there are more cell phones in service in the United 
States than there are citizens.157 Phones are remarkably 
inexpensive—if they are not included in a service plan for free, basic 
phones are available for tens of dollars, and there are federal subsidy 
programs available to make sure that low-income individuals have 
access to them.158 The cost of service is also much lower. In the early 
1990s, even short calls could cost several dollars;159 today every 
service plan currently featured in advertising by each of the major 
wireless carriers includes unlimited voice and text service.160 And 
even the most basic of cell phones today is more feature-rich than 
the most advanced telephones in 1991, featuring Caller ID displays, 
programmable ring tones, easy volume controls and mute 
capabilities, and the ability to seamlessly ignore unwanted calls or 
send them to voicemail. 
The role of the TCPA is notable in today’s world of multi-
modal communications. In 1991 the telephone was the only form 
of potentially intrusive on-demand distant communications. 
Today, we have landline phones, cell phones, text messages, e-
mail, telephone-like Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) products 
(some of which allow video, in addition to audio, communications) 
like Skype and Facetime, other VoIP applications like Google 
Hangouts, and myriad other messaging applications from 
Messenger and WhatsApp to AOL Instant Messenger and ICQ. 
Yet despite this myriad of communications media, and their many 
common features, only calls to “telephones” are captured by the 
TCPA. Indeed, some courts have distinguished VoIP platforms 
 
 156 See Landler, supra note 24. 
 157 See supra note 148. 
 158 See Lifeline Program for Low-Income Consumers, FCC (Aug. 16, 2018) https://
www.fcc.gov/general/lifeline-program-low-income-consumers [https://perma.cc/JQ8U-FF9X]. 
 159 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 160 This statement is based on a review of the service plans currently listed on 
the websites of AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon. These, and other, carriers continue 
to offer plans with per minute limits. It is, however, the case that these prices are 
significantly less than the costs incurred at the time of the TCPA’s adoption. Even the 
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lower per-minute costs and of Caller ID technology, it is unlikely that consumers using 
these higher-cost plans with incur pecuniary losses from unwanted telephone calls. 
See, e.g., AT&T, https://www.att.com/plans/wireless.html [https://perma.cc/E5D2-HVLH]; 
SPRINT, https://www.sprint.com/en/shop/plans.html?INTNAV=TopNav:Shop:AllPlans 
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from those covered by the TCPA on the grounds that there is no 
per call charge.161 
Less visible to consumers are the myriad changes to the 
underlying telephone network—and, also, the surprising lack of 
changes. In 1991 the telephone network was still largely analog, 
especially in the last mile connections to individual telephones. 
Even the parts of the network that were digital had limited 
capabilities. Features like Caller ID, call forwarding, speed 
dialing, and others were still relatively new. Today, the 
telephone network is almost entirely digital, and has far more 
sophisticated capabilities than were possible or even conceivable 
in the early 1990s. These advances, however, should not be 
overstated: the telephone system is complex, the industry 
conservative, and the network subject to highly ossified 
regulation. Much of the underlying technology—the basic 
protocols that control how telephone switches communicate and 
how phone calls are routed, for instance—are still based on 
systems developed in the 1980s.162 On the regulatory front, there 
is active discussion at the FCC today over the role of telephone 
carriers in blocking calls from callers that are known to be 
fraudulently using spoofed Caller ID information.163 
Let that sink in for a moment: the FCC currently 
prohibits telephone companies from blocking calls that are 
clearly fraudulent—the very calls that make up most of the 
robocall complaints that the FCC and FTC receive. That is akin 
to the United States Department of Agriculture requiring 
supermarkets to sell produce that is known to have listeria in it, 
or the Consumer Product Safety Commission requiring stores to 
continue selling products with known defects. Rather than 
require telephone carriers to take action against these known 
harms, the FCC has instead clung dearly to its vision of 
telephone carriers as common carriers—passive conduits 
through which phone calls flow between active call participants. 
Rather than allow (let alone require) these carriers to implement 
solutions that could address the vast majority of the robocall 
problem, the FCC has instead placed a complex compliance 
burden on calling parties and the substantial burden of dealing 
with non-complaint calls on individuals. 
 
 161 An important point made by editors of the Brooklyn Law Review. See Klein 
v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 3d 563, 581 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Breda v. Cellco 
P’ship, No. CV 16-11512-DJC, 2017 WL 5586661, at *3–4 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2017) (calls 
via VoIP not subject to TCPA because they are not charged per call), appeal filed, (1st 
Cir. Jan. 11, 2018). 
 162 See, e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 28. 
 163 See discussion infra Section III.A. and Part IV. 
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C. The Law Has Changed 
The last set of changes, those to the law, are more recent. 
The basic contours of First Amendment law described in Part I—
commercial speech and content-neutral speech regulation being 
subject to roughly identical forms of intermediate scrutiny and 
content-based speech regulation being subject to strict scrutiny—
describe the free speech law that most law students have learned 
since the TCPA was adopted. But in recent years the Supreme 
Court has redefined these contours, clarifying its understanding of 
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral speech 
in ways that suggests both that much speech regulation that has 
previously been thought of as content-neutral is actually content-
based, and that regulation of commercial speech may also be 
content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny.164 
The purpose of the discussion that follows is not to 
advocate for, or to try to advance understanding of, these recent 
cases. There is extensive discussion of these cases’ meaning and 
how doctrine in this area will continue to evolve elsewhere.165 
Rather, the goal here is to apply these cases as they are naturally 
read, and as lower courts have begun to apply them in the context 
of the TCPA. Generally, these cases (most notably Reed) have 
called into question the lower protection afforded to commercial 
speech.166 But as Justice Kagan notes in her concurrence in Reed, 
the Court’s approach is concerningly broad and threatens to bring 
vast swaths of speech regulation under the auspices of strict 
scrutiny.167 Even if the argument articulated below, that post-
Reed the TCPA needs to be scrutinized strictly, fails, this article’s 
analysis of the TCPA’s substantive problems remains valid under 
less probing standards of review. 
One of the Court’s speech opinions in particular, Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, has raised questions that are relevant in the 
context of the TCPA.168 As discussed in Part IV, some lower 
courts have interpreted Reed to subject the TCPA and state level 
 
 164 See infra Sections IV.A.–B. 
 165 See, e.g., Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. 
REV. 66, 69 (2017); Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
1427, 1429–30 (2017); Lee Mason, Comment, Content Neutrality and Commercial Speech 
Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 955, 997–98 (2017); Note, Free 
Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 1981–82 (2016). 
 166 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 167 See id. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“To do its intended work, of course, 
the category of content-based regulation triggering strict scrutiny must sweep more 
broadly than the actual harm; that category exists to create a buffer zone guaranteeing 
that the government cannot favor or disfavor certain viewpoints. But that buffer zone 
need not extend forever.”). 
 168 See id. at 2224 (majority opinion). 
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equivalents of the TCPA to strict scrutiny. Others, including 
McCullen v. Coakley and Sorrell v. IMS Health, reflect ongoing 
development of the Court’s understanding of the distinction 
between content-neutral and content-based regulation. These 
cases suggest two jurisprudential shifts: first, that much speech 
regulation that has previously been thought of as content-
neutral is actually content-based; and second, that regulation of 
commercial speech may also be content-based regulation subject 
to strict scrutiny. 
In Reed, the Supreme Court invalidated Gilbert, 
Arizona’s Sign Code—a law enacted to regulate the size and 
placement of signs.169 The central question in this case was 
whether this statute was content-based or content-neutral. The 
Court held that it was content-based, and in so doing it restated 
the defining characteristics of content-based regulation in a way 
that arguably redrew the line between content-neutral and 
content-based regulations.170 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Thomas explained: 
Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to 
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message 
expressed. This commonsense meaning of the phrase “content based” 
requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech “on its face” 
draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Some 
facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated 
speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, 
defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are 
distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, 
therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.171 
This framing shifts the Court’s focus by emphasizing that a 
regulation is necessarily content-based if it draws distinctions 
based on the message a speaker conveys. Previously, some courts 
had focused on whether the purpose or effect of the regulation was 
content-based—so long as a regulation as “justified without 
reference to content,” even a statute that made content-based 
distinctions on its face could be deemed content-neutral if those 
distinctions were incidental to a content-neutral purpose.172 The 
 
 169 TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZ., LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Sign Code), ch. 1, 
§ 4.402 (2005). 
 170 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 171 Id. (citations omitted). 
 172 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 800–01 (1989); City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293–95, 297 (1984). 
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Reed Court expressly rejected this view.173 Lower courts had 
interpreted prior cases “as suggesting that a government’s 
purpose is relevant even when a law is content based on its face. 
That is incorrect.”174 Instead, Reed recast the inquiry as one 
comprising two steps: if a statute or regulation is facially content-
based, that ends the inquiry; if it is not, then courts inquire more 
deeply into its purpose and effects to characterize whether it is 
content-neutral or content-based.175 
As discussed below, Reed has been used in recent litigation 
challenging the TCPA and related statutes.176 Following Reed’s 
instruction that a statute that on its face makes content-based 
distinctions is necessarily content-based and is therefore subject 
to strict scrutiny, these courts have broken from past cases that 
have treated the TCPA as content-neutral.177 
It is important to recognize that Reed is on the leading 
edge of recent developments in a notoriously tricky area of law—
its full meaning and the extent to which it brings speech within 
the ambit of strict scrutiny and to which commercial speech 
remains subject to more forgiving analysis are the subject of 
extensive ongoing scholarly debate.178 McCullen, for instance, 
also a recent case, reminds us that “a facially neutral law does 
not become content based simply because it may 
disproportionately affect speech on certain topics.”179 It is 
unclear how to evaluate such a statute where disproportionate 
effects are clear on the face of the statute—or, to state the matter 
more confoundingly, it is unclear what “facial” means. Reed, for 
instance, suggests that strict scrutiny will apply in such cases if 
“the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content 
preference,” which suggests that content preferences may be 
found based upon implied congressional intent.180 Such inference 
seems a far cry from a facial content preference. On the other 
hand, McCullen tempers analysis in the other direction, 
explaining that “[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to 
 
 173 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (“On its face, the Sign Code is a content-based 
regulation of speech. We thus have no need to consider the government’s justifications 
or purposes for enacting the Code to determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.”). 
 174 Id. at 2228. 
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 176 See infra Section IV.A. 
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the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an 
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”181 
This suggests that a central question in deciding whether a 
statute or regulation that has a disproportionate effect on 
certain topics is whether such effects where truly incidental to, 
or were actually an object of, the legislative or regulatory design. 
Questions such as this are important for evaluating the 
TCPA and the FCC’s implementing rules. As discussed below,182 
the TCPA disproportionately affects certain speech on certain 
types of issues. Whether this is incidental to Congress’s 
disapprobation of calls placed using autodialers or prerecorded 
messages, or rather disapprobation of speech on such issues is the 
reason for Congress’s regulation of autodialers and prerecorded 
messages, is important to understanding whether the TCPA is best 
understood as content-neutral or content-based. 
III. CONCEPTUAL PUZZLES PROMPTED BY THE TCPA’S 
REGULATION OF SPEECH 
The TCPA was written at a simpler time to address 
simpler problems created by and using simpler technology. It is 
unsurprising that it has not aged well. As the uses and users of 
technology have changed, distinctions that did not seem to 
implicate the content of communications, or that were made to 
address legitimate non-content interests by technologically 
appropriate means, must now be evaluated in a new context and 
in light of contemporary technology. 
This context of technological change raises questions that 
are more challenging than those relating to the TCPA’s ongoing 
vitality under the First Amendment—questions that also raise 
more fundamental questions about regulation in technologically 
dynamic settings. The first question stems from the 
government’s role in regulating the design and capabilities of 
telecommunications networks: but for government regulation of 
how telephone networks operate, carriers would likely have long 
ago implemented network features to resolve much of the 
robocall problem. Can the government impose speech restrictive 
rules to address conduct that would be less problematic for the 
government’s own regulation? 
A second question considers the privacy rationale 
supporting adoption of the TCPA—indeed, the idea that the 
 
 181 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2531 (alteration in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock 
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 182 See infra Section IV.B.1. 
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government has an interest in protecting the sanctity of the home 
is both the principal legislative justification for the TCPA as well 
as the most substantive defense offered by the FCC in its TCPA 
orders.183 As discussed elsewhere in this article, modern 
technology already does, and dramatically further could, reduce 
the privacy-invasive aspect of unsolicited telephone calls.184 
Perhaps more interesting, though framed as protecting the 
sanctity of the home, the TCPA really protects the sanctity of the 
phone. This represents a silent but important shift in the scope of 
protection, assuring that individuals be free from unwanted 
contact by third parties not merely when at home but also while 
out and about in the public world and otherwise engaged in the 
bazaar of ideas. 
A. The Government Cannot Regulate Speech to Curtail a 
Problem of Its Own Creation 
One of the most important, and least appreciated, aspects 
of the contemporary problem of robocalls is the extent to which it 
is a problem of the government’s own making.185 The FCC has long 
regulated the operation of the telephone network, from technology 
standards to interoperability and interexchange requirements to 
number assignment.186 It is due to government regulation that the 
architecture of the telephone network today is remarkably similar 
today to the network in use at the time the TCPA was drafted. 
Today, the FCC is considering various changes that will 
improve the resilience of the telephone network to practices such 
as unwanted phone calls.187 Authentication technologies like 
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 184 See supra Section II.B.; see also infra Sections III.B., IV.B.4. 
 185 See infra Part V. 
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 187 See Call Authentication Trust Anchor, Notice of Inquiry, 32 FCC Rcd. 5988, 
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SHAKEN/STIR,188 granting permission to carriers to block known-
spoofed numbers,189 and other technological improvements will, on 
the one hand, dramatically reduce the ability of these callers to 
engage in problematic practices and, on the other hand, give 
consumers greater information about and control over the calls 
that they receive. 
Even as the technology is unquestionably improving, the 
government’s role in these improvements raises questions about the 
propriety of the underlying TCPA. It would be exceedingly difficult, 
for instance, for the TCPA to survive review under strict scrutiny: 
one cannot colorably say that a regulation is the least restrictive 
means of achieving a government purpose if the government 
controls alternative, less restrictive means to achieve it.190 
The more difficult case arises in the context of 
intermediate scrutiny, under which the regulation must be 
narrowly tailored but not necessarily the least restrictive means 
to achieve the government’s purpose. Instead of requiring the 
least restrictive means, intermediate scrutiny requires only that 
the regulation leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication.191 But while it is conceivable in the general case 
that a regulation where the government controls less restrictive 
alternatives to curtailing the prohibited speech may survive 
intermediate scrutiny, it seems unlikely that the TCPA is such 
a regulation. As a starting point, there likely are no alternative 
means of communication for much of the speech prohibited by 
the TCPA. This would be the case, for instance, in the example 
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 189 Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Report and 
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 190 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780–82 (2014) 
(“The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding, and it is not satisfied 
here. . . . In the end, however, we need not rely on the option of a new, government-funded 
program in order to conclude that the HHS regulations fail the least-restrictive-means test. 
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than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 238 (1997) 
(“Moreover, even accepting as reasonable Congress’ conclusion that cable operators have 
incentives to favor affiliated programmers, Congress has already limited the number of 
channels on a cable system that can be occupied by affiliated programmers. Once a cable 
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affiliated programmers, it could simply adjust the cap. Must-carry simply cannot be 
justified as a response to the allegedly ‘substantial’ problem of vertical integration.” 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)). 
 191 See supra Section I.C. 
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of any system that sends automated messages in response to text 
messages, or for any business or service built around text 
messages. Alternative means of communication are also unlikely 
satisfactory for services such as health-related messages, which 
have an element of timeliness that cannot be matched by mail 
and that are often sent to individuals who may not have access 
to other means of communication. One potential response to this 
is that one can always avoid liability under the TCPA by 
avoiding automated dialing systems and prerecorded messages. 
This may be the case in principle—but in practice these systems 
are used precisely because they are low cost and highly reliable. 
One would not, for instance, want to rely on humans to correctly 
dial hundreds or thousands of phone numbers per day to 
communicate sensitive health information. Beyond the privacy 
concerns that this may raise, it creates serious concerns the 
information could be provided to the wrong person—and 
therefore not delivered to a person that needs it. 
But there is an even greater problem with the approach 
that has historically been effectively mandated by the FCC’s 
TCPA rules: compared to alternatives, it conflicts with the core 
privacy rationale proffered by Congress to justify the TCPA. As 
discussed in more detail below, the core purpose and legal 
justification for the TCPA is to “protect the privacy interests of 
residential telephone subscribers.”192 This purpose is supported 
by longstanding understandings—and matching precedent—
that individuals have substantial interests in the sanctuary of 
their home.193 The cases supporting this idea, however, offer a 
more attenuated understanding of the sanctity of the home than 
simply that it is a sanctuary from the marketplace of ideas. 
Rather, they more carefully balance the First Amendment rights 
of individuals to engage in speech against the rights of 
individuals to be free from unwanted speech in the sanctuary of 
their home. The key case—cited by the FCC in implementing the 
TCPA194—is Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Department, in which the 
Supreme Court upheld a statute allowing homeowners to 
require that their names be removed from mailing lists.195 
Rowan is frequently cited to demonstrate the sanctity of 
the home against unwelcome speech.196 But the opinion is more 
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 193 See infra Section III.B. 
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 195 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970). 
 196 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–17 (2000) (“The unwilling 
listener’s interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified 
in our cases. . . . The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of 
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careful than that simple reading suggests. The statute at issue 
in Rowan allows homeowners to opt out of unwanted speech—it 
is therefore dramatically different from the TCPA, which 
requires callers to obtain express, sometimes written, consent 
before placing certain calls.197 The difference between Rowan’s 
opt-out and the TCPA’s opt-in regimes has important First 
Amendment implications: under Rowan, the outside speaker has 
at least an initial opportunity to speak, but must respect the 
homeowner’s wish for privacy. The Court has not articulated a 
categorical delineation of the constitutional permissibility or 
requirements of opt-out vs. opt-in regimes. Subsequent cases, 
however, continue to express a clear preference that individuals 
be able to manifest considered expressions of what information 
they want to receive.198 
The FCC has approached the telephone network from a 
different perspective. Rather than thinking about how to design 
the telephone network to give individuals greater information 
about and control over the calls that they receive, the 
Commission has thought of the network as a common carriage 
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 198 See infra Section III.B. 
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system in which all calls must be carried on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. In other words, the FCC has focused on the carrier side of 
the industry, making sure that telecom companies reliably carry 
all calls, instead of the consumer side of the industry. Of course, 
these two perspectives are not necessarily in conflict—the FCC 
could work (and today increasingly is working) to ensure both 
that carriers carry all legitimate calls and that they deploy 
technologies that give consumers greater information about and 
control over those calls. 
But therein lies the rub: the TCPA assumes the carrier-
centric model in which consumers have only very coarse control 
over the calls that they receive. When approaching the question 
from either the perspective of narrow tailoring or from that of 
Rowan’s preference for individuals’ control over what information 
he or she receives, the TCPA is unduly burdensome. 
B. The Sanctuary of the Home vs. the Sanctuary of the 
Phone 
The core purpose of, and arguably core legal justification 
for, the TCPA is to “protect the privacy interests of residential 
telephone subscribers.”199 The legal basis for this goal is situated 
in the understanding of the sanctity of the home as a sanctuary. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized a distinction between 
the public and private spheres.200 The life of an American 
individual in the public sphere is characterized by the 
marketplace of ideas, a marketplace in which there is no partial 
participation. But once in the sanctuary of the home, that same 
individual is shielded from the demands and curiosities of the 
public. In the American tradition, this protection runs most 
strongly against intrusion by the government itself.201 But that 
 
 199 S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991). 
 200 See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content 
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 201 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment 
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men’s minds.”); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (“[T]he home is first 
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protection also runs against unwelcome intrusions by private 
actors. Thus, in Rowan the Court upheld a statute requiring 
advertisers to allow homeowners to opt-out of receiving further 
mailings from them;202 in Martin v. City of Struthers the Court 
rejected a statute that prohibited door-to-door solicitation but 
expressed that a more limited prohibition that required solicitors 
to abide by “no solicitors” signs is likely constitutionally 
permissible;203 in Meese v. Keene the Court upheld labelling 
requirements on certain political mailings;204 and in FCC v. 
Pacifica Found the Court upheld content restrictions on 
broadcast radio on the grounds that individuals could not 
otherwise prevent unwanted content from entering their 
homes.205 These and other cases are all premised on the idea that 
individuals have a right to be secure from unwelcome speech 
within the sanctuary of the home—and that the government plays 
an important function in helping to secure that right. 
But modern communications technology, including 
wireless telephones and the internet generally, is arguably 
eroding the boundaries of the home.206 It is ever harder to keep 
a clear delineation between what is outside of and what falls 
within the boundaries of the home. The internet is akin to the 
modern public square,207 but most people access that public 
square on computers or mobile phones, from the comfort of their 
couch. And those same devices, especially cell phones—devices 
that increasingly define much of our private lives—come with 
many of us wherever we go. One need only watch a few minutes 
of internet videos of people walking into obstacles or falling into 
holes while engrossed in the private world of their cell phones to 
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understand how completely the experience of these devices can 
insulate one from the public marketplace of ideas.208 
Turning first to the question of the sanctity of the home 
qua home, the Court has never recognized the boundaries of the 
home as inviolate. To the contrary, it has expressly struck down 
statutes that treat it as such.209 The balance struck by the Court 
is rather more nuanced, captured by Justice Black: “Freedom to 
distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to 
receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation or a free society 
that . . . it must be fully preserved.”210 This balance carries two 
competing factors: the need to be able to distribute information to 
every citizen, and the ability of the citizen to specify the terms on 
which she receives it. These factors have an inverse relationship. 
The less ability individuals have to control how and what 
information they receive, the greater their need for sanctuary 
from unwanted information. Thus, and as discussed throughout 
this article, to the extent that technologies that offer individuals 
greater control over the telephone calls they received are 
implemented—and especially to the extent that the government 
has influence over implementation of such technologies—the less 
justification there is for the TCPA. 
The second question is conceptually more difficult: as 
Americans increasingly turn from residential landline 
telephones to personal wireless telephones, the scope of the 
TCPA’s protections changes from the “sanctuary of the home” to 
the “sanctuary of the phone.” This change is far from 
inconsequential: the defining characteristic of the mobile phone 
is that it is untethered from the home. This expansion in scope 
thus expands the protection afforded by the TCPA beyond that 
which has previously been considered—let alone permitted—by 
the Court. Making matters even more complicated, while the 
immediate response may be to assume that this is problematic 
(anything falling outside of the sanctuary of the home generally 
being seen as fair game in the public sphere), the Court has 
offered some hints that the protection afforded inside the home 
may not be confined to the home’s walls. For instance, the Court 
has noted that “radio [listened to in the home] can be turned off, 
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 209 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72–73 (1983). 
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but not so the billboard.”211 And in discussing its holding in 
Pacifica, the Court in Bolger explained that mail delivered to the 
home (as in Rowan) is “far less intrusive and uncontrollable” 
than the broadcast programming in Pacifica.212 Importantly, 
while Pacifica was expressly concerned with the receipt of 
programming within the home, concerns about “intrusive[ness] 
and uncontrollab[ility]” apply strongly to wireless phones 
wherever they are located.213 Just as one may retreat to the 
sanctuary of the home to escape the public sphere, one may also 
retreat to the public sphere to escape the banality of the living 
room TV—but with the mobile phone, it may follow us no matter 
which sphere we transiently occupy, so the intrusion of unwanted 
calls is inescapable. Just as the receipt of mail is less intrusive 
than the receipt of broadcast television, the receipt of broadcast 
television (which one experiences only in their home and while 
watching a powered-on television) is less intrusive than the 
receipt of unwanted telephone calls on a mobile phone (which one 
almost always has by their side and almost always is powered on). 
This, of course, is an overstatement—just like the radio 
or television, one may turn off their phone or leave it at home 
when they go out. But this is a high cost to pay, at least for some, 
to avoid unwanted telephone calls. The modern phone, in 
particular, is more than a telephone.214 It is a constant 
connection to the modern public square. One could argue that 
the time has come to redelineate the boundaries of an 
individual’s life, adding a “connected sphere” to the public and 
private spheres. Just as one should have sanctuary in their 
home, one should not be forced to disconnect from their online, 
connected-sphere, life to avoid the burden of intrusive and 
uncontrollable invasions. Alternatively, one could treat the 
mobile phone as an extension of the home—surely that is how 
many implicitly think of it. 
On the other hand, one is exposed to intrusive, 
uncontrollable, and unwanted invasion any time they leave the 
sanctuary of the home. That is the nature of the public sphere. It  
 211 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 221 (1975) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (quoting Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)). 
 212 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74; Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, at 736 (1970). 
 213 Id. (“In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation this Court did recognize that the 
Government’s interest in protecting the young justified special treatment of an afternoon 
broadcast heard by adults as well as children. At the same time, the majority 
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is a chaotic bazaar of distraction and ideas. The fact that one 
vector by which these distractions may vie for one’s attention is 
their mobile phone—a device that is readily ignored and that 
provides at least minimal information indicating the character of 
a given call215—seems an insufficient basis for reconceptualizing 
the relationship between the public and private spheres. 
The central issue in both of these questions is, ultimately, 
one of control: to what extent does the individual whose privacy we 
are interested in protecting have the ability to control what 
information she receives in a way that is not intrusive upon her 
privacy, but also allows her to remain a participant in the 
connected sphere? Where that ability is low, there is greater need 
for prescriptive rules to control how and who is able to intrude upon 
her privacy. But where there is greater ability for the calling and 
called parties to coordinate in a way that does not unduly burden 
the called party, there is less need for prescriptive rules beyond 
those that require the use of efficient coordination mechanisms.216 
But there is yet another layer to this analysis: where the law is 
endogenous to the ability of the parties to coordinate—that is, the 
law has some ability to affect the transaction costs of negotiation—
then we should adopt rules that tend to decrease these costs to 
facilitate interactions between the parties.217 
This discussion is framed here in the normative terms of 
law and economics—but it also reflects the technological reality of 
the First Amendment and unwanted phone calls. For most of the 
time since the TCPA was adopted, there was relatively little that 
could be done (legally or technologically) to facilitate coordination 
between calling and called parties. As such, the TCPA’s strong, 
prescriptive rules were both reasonably tailored and the least 
restrictive approach that could be taken to address the problem of 
unwanted calls. But with modern technology much more can be 
done. As such, today there are less restrictive means that can be 
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technologically implemented and that would accomplish the goals 
of the TCPA in a more narrowly tailored way.218 
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSES OF THE TCPA 
Because the TCPA regulates speech, the First 
Amendment has been, and almost certainly will continue to be, 
the primary legal lens through which the TCPA is assessed. Early 
First Amendment challenges to the TCPA were discussed in Part 
I.219 The discussion now turns to contemporary challenges to the 
TCPA in light of the various changes that have occurred since 
those earlier cases. It begins in Section IV.A with a discussion of 
recent cases, in particular those that have been brought since 
Reed was decided by the Supreme Court. The general trend of 
those cases, which have focused on narrow content distinctions 
made in the TCPA or its state-law equivalents, has been for courts 
to find that, under Reed, these laws are content-based and subject 
to strict scrutiny—but to then find sufficiently compelling need in 
each given case to satisfy strict scrutiny. The focus is expanded in 
Section IV.B, to consider a broader critique of the purposes and 
justifications of the TCPA in light of current law and technology. 
A. Recent First Amendment Analysis of the TCPA 
In recent years, First Amendment challenges to the TCPA 
have been reinvigorated. This is in part out of concern arising 
from the substantial increase in TCPA class actions in recent 
years; it is in part due to recent changes in the Commission’s 
substantive TCPA rules and the changed factual setting 
surrounding the use of automatic telephone dialers; and it is in 
part due to changes in First Amendment caselaw. The second and 
third factors are discussed below. 
The highest profile recent challenge to the FCC’s TCPA 
rules is ACA International v. FCC, decided by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in March 
2018 nearly a year and a half after oral arguments.220 This case 
challenged the FCC’s 2015 TCPA Omnibus Order on a wide 
range of grounds and led to its partial rejection by the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals.221 This case did include a First 
Amendment challenge to the FCC’s Order—however it was one 
of many issues in the case and was framed in relatively narrow 
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terms.222 Rather than focus on the First Amendment issues, the 
core foci of this challenge and the court’s ultimate opinion were 
the Commission’s overbroad definition of what constitutes an 
“autodialer” for purposes of the TCPA and the Commission’s 
single-call safe harbor for reassigned numbers.223 The court 
rejected the 2015 Order’s definition of autodialer as overbroad—
the Order effectively said any device with the capability of being 
programmed to place automated calls (which would include any 
modern smartphone) was an autodialer for the purposes of 
TCPA enforcement.224 And the court rejected the single-call safe 
harbor as arbitrary and capricious because the Commission did 
not articulate why a single call was a better or worse threshold 
than any particular alternatives.225 
While ACA International is the most significant recent 
challenge related to the TCPA, the case does not significantly 
feature the First Amendment. Other challenges to the TCPA 
have been brought, however, following on the heels of Reed. In 
one such case involving South Carolina’s state-law equivalent of 
the TCPA, Cahaly v. LaRosa, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit drew upon Reed in its First Amendment 
analysis of the law.226 The court began by noting Reed’s 
explanation “that ‘the crucial first step in the content-neutrality 
analysis’ is to ‘determin[e] whether the law is content neutral on 
its face,’” and noted that this abrogates the circuit’s prior 
approach to content-neutrality analysis.227 Applying Reed, the 
court went on to “find that South Carolina’s anti-robocall statute 
[was] content based because it [made] content distinctions on its 
face. . . . Here, the anti-robocall statute applie[d] to calls with a 
consumer or political message but [did] not reach calls made for 
any other purpose.”228 
Based on Reed, the Fourth Circuit found that the South 
Carolina TCPA-equivalent statute is subject to strict scrutiny.229 
It then went on to invalidate the statute, finding that (assuming 
the government does have a compelling interest in regulating 
unsolicited calls at all) the statute’s approach was not the least 
restrictive means of accomplishing the government’s purpose, 
that the statute was overinclusive (burdening non-problematic 
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speech in addition to problematic speech) and underinclusive 
(failing to address substantial amounts of problematic speech 
within the ambit of the statute).230 
It is important not to read cases such as Cahaly too 
broadly, as they are addressing state-equivalents of the TCPA, 
which often have important differences from the federal 
TCPA.231 For instance, Cahaly related to political messages, 
which by and large are not problematic under the federal TCPA. 
Moreover, Cahaly was decided on a record in which the 
government did not present contrary arguments to demonstrate 
that the statute in question was, in fact, the least restrictive 
means to address the interest at issue. 
Post-Reed cases challenging the federal TCPA are, 
however, beginning to appear. For instance, Facebook has 
recently raised a First Amendment defense based on Reed in a 
series of Ninth Circuit cases. In these cases, Facebook is facing 
TCPA violations relating to text messages it sent out as birthdate 
reminders to its users.232 In one of these cases, Brickman v. 
Facebook, Facebook moved to dismiss the case on the grounds 
that the TCPA violates the First Amendment.233 In a move that 
surprised nearly everyone, the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California applied Reed and found that 
the TCPA is subject to strict scrutiny, but also found that the 
statute survives such analysis.234 In his opinion, the judge 
considered the same arguments made in Cahaly—that the 
statute was not the least restrictive means to accomplishing its 
goals, and was both over and underinclusive—and reached the 
opposite conclusion.235 The judge, however, certified Facebook’s 
motion for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the 
question of whether the TCPA survives strict scrutiny.236 
A final post-Reed case bears discussion: Mejia v. Time 
Warner Cable, decided in the United States District Court for 
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the Southern District of New York in August 2017.237 This was a 
class action filed in 2015 by former Time Warner Cable 
customers. These customers alleged that Time Warner Cable 
repeatedly called them using automatic telephone dialers after 
they cancelled their cable service in an attempt to get them to 
resume that service. In late 2016, Time Warner Cable moved for 
summary judgment on the proceedings, arguing that, post-Reed, 
the TCPA is facially unconstitutional.238 Focusing on the 
exemption from TCPA liability for calls made in an effort to 
collect upon debts guaranteed by the United States, the court, 
like the Brickman court, found that the TCPA made content-
based distinctions and therefore was subject to strict scrutiny.239 
In this case, “‘[i]n determining content neutrality, the 
government’s purpose is the controlling consideration’”—but, 
the court responded,  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reed . . . roundly forecloses this 
argument. The Court in Reed made clear that “[a] law that is content 
based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the 
government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of 
‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”240 
The district court, however, also went on to follow the same path 
as the Brickman court in finding that the TCPA survives strict 
scrutiny.241 Focusing on the debt-collection provision—the 
provision at issue in the case that the court found to trigger strict 
scrutiny242—the court found it to serve a compelling interest, to 
be narrowly tailored, and the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing at interest.243 
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B. A New First Amendment Analysis of the TCPA 
As discussed above, the recent cases that challenge the 
TCPA on First Amendment grounds demonstrate some of the 
contemporary First Amendment concerns about the Act.244 Until 
recently, it was generally understood that the TCPA was a 
content-neutral regulation of primarily commercial speech and 
that it was a permissible means to the important end of 
protecting consumers from privacy-invading phone calls. But as 
law and technology have continued to evolve, and as the FCC 
has worked to adapt a law written to address a problem defined 
in terms of 1980s-era technology to the modern setting, this 
accepted wisdom is increasingly suspect. 
Recent cases like Facebook and Time Warner Cable have 
called this conventional wisdom into question through surprisingly 
conventional means. The plaintiffs in Facebook and Time Warner 
Cable successfully argued that the TCPA’s exemption for collectors 
of government-backed debt was a content-based distinction.245 The 
plaintiffs in Cahaly did the same thing using exemptions from 
state TCPA-equivalents for political calls.246 As discussed above, 
neither challenged the overall structure of the TCPA, but in both 
cases the content-based exceptions to that basic structure were 
enough to bring strict scrutiny to bear. 
But the TCPA’s First Amendment infirmities run much 
deeper than these arguments suggest. The Act and the FCC’s 
implementing rules are fundamentally structured around an 
entire series of content-based distinctions. Moreover, as technology 
has changed, the privacy interests that initially justified the Act 
have all but vanished; today, the Act’s primary purpose is to 
disadvantage disfavored speech.247 To the extent that the Act does 
continue to promote a legitimate government interest, it does so 
poorly by dramatically burdening desired speech in a laughably 
ineffective attempt to reign in the modern plight of illegitimate 
robocalls. Finally, advances in telecommunications technology 
since the adoption of the TCPA have produced numerous tools that 
are less restrictive means of addressing the problems the TCPA 
was meant to address—the greatest impediment to adoption of 
these technologies is the government itself. 
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1. The TCPA Makes Content-Based Distinctions That 
May Subject It to Strict Scrutiny 
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits found that the TCPA 
survived under Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny style 
test in Moser, Van Bergen, and Missouri ex rel. Nixon.248 These 
are canonical among the cases at the foundation of the modern 
understanding of the TCPA as permissible regulation of 
commercial speech. In fact, neither circuit even questioned that 
this was the correct approach: the Moser court accepted the 
District court’s determination that the statute should be 
analyzed under Central Hudson,249 and the parties stipulated to 
this approach in Missouri ex rel. Nixon.250 Today it seems likely 
that these cases got it wrong—that the TCPA’s content-based 
distinctions subject it to strict scrutiny.251 
More recent Supreme Court precedents, such as Reed, 
suggest that the TCPA and FCC rules are content-based.252 
Arguably, Moser says so itself. There, the circuit court relied on 
the district court’s determination that the TCPA should be 
evaluated under Central Hudson—but the district court reached 
this conclusion by following logic that is likely incorrect today.253 
Specifically, the district court started by “conclud[ing] that the 
TCPA is a content-based regulation, and cannot be justified as a 
legitimate time, place or manner restriction on protected 
speech.”254 Under Reed, that ends the matter, but the Court went 
on to evaluate the government’s purpose, finding that it did not 
intend to regulate the content of the expression—only the 
manner in which that content is expressed.255 But as Reed 
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 254 Moser v. FCC, 826 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Or. 1993). 
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explains, the idea “that a government’s purpose is relevant even 
when a law is content based on its face. . . . is incorrect.”256 
The TCPA and FCC rules make several distinctions, 
many of which are best characterized as content based—some 
facially, others as a result of the regulation’s disproportionate 
effect. They distinguish between calls that use autodialers or 
prerecorded messages and those that use a human hand and 
voice. They distinguish between commercial and noncommercial 
calls.257 They distinguish between calls made to wireless and 
residential wireline telephones.258 They draw distinctions 
between calls made with and without prior express consent, and 
between different forms of expressing that consent.259 And the 
FCC’s 2015 Order (since rejected by the D.C. Circuit) 
distinguished between calls made (only to wireless phones) to 
numbers that have been reassigned and those that have not.260 
Distinctions such as these demonstrate the soundness of 
the recent trend of subjecting the TCPA to strict scrutiny. In part, 
they lend further support to this conclusion under Reed. But they 
also reveal that, as telephone technology has changed—
particularly as the wireless phone has ascended to become most 
individuals’ primary telephone—the impact of the TCPA has 
become more substantial and less evenly distributed (that is, 
neutral) at the same time as the privacy concerns justifying the 
TCPA have increasingly diminished. 
For instance, a ban on autodialers as a means of 
communication disparately affects certain kinds of information 
and is therefore effectively content-based. While autodialers and 
prerecorded or artificial voice messages can certainly be used in 
problematic ways, there are some types of messages that are 
better conveyed using these technologies than manually dialed 
or (especially) live operator engagement. Informational and 
transactional calls, especially those relating to personal 
financial or health information, may be better made using 
artificially-generated voices—indeed, such technologies 
substantially reduce the privacy invasion of having another  
 256 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). The opinion’s 
discussion continues, concluding “we have repeatedly ‘rejected the argument that 
“discriminatory . . . treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only when the 
legislature intends to suppress certain ideas.”’ We do so again today.” Id. at 2229 (quoting 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)). 
 257 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 
2395 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B)(i) (2012)). 
 258 2003 TCPA Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14113–16 (2003). 
 259 FAQs on Robocalls, FCC (Feb. 23, 2016), https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/
consumerfacts/robocalls.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WEJ-KUQF]. 
 260 2015 TCPA Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7999–8000 (2015); see also discussion 
supra Section IV.A. (discussing the DC Circuit’s recent opinion in ACA International v. FCC). 
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person reviewing and discussing sensitive personal information. 
And the cost of using these technologies can dramatically reduce 
firms’ costs of doing business—especially in the modern mass-
scale era where a single firm may do business across the United 
States or world—which can in turn redound in price benefits and 
other savings to customers. Different types of messages are 
simply better suited to delivery using different technologies, 
depending upon their content. Under Reed, disparate regulatory 
treatment of these technologies is therefore arguably content-
based and subject to strict scrutiny, whether the government 
intended such disparate results or not. 
The clearest distinction that the TCPA and FCC rules 
make is between commercial and noncommercial speech.261 This 
is a clear, facial, content-based distinction. Early First 
Amendment challenges, such as those discussed above, to the 
TCPA treated this TCPA’s regulation of telemarketing as a 
regulation of commercial speech, and therefore applied Central 
Hudson intermediate scrutiny.262 But Sorrell and Reed suggest 
that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception” to the rule that where 
regulation is “designed to impose a specific, content-based 
burden on protected expression. . . . heightened judicial scrutiny 
is warranted.”263 Indeed, Sorrell involved a law that restricted 
the disclosure of prescription information for marketing 
purposes—a situation closely related to the TCPA’s regulation of 
telemarketing calls—and subjected that law to strict scrutiny.264 
The fact that the speech was of a commercial nature was of no 
concern to the Court in light of the clear content-based nature of 
the law. To the contrary, the Court noted that “[a] ‘consumer’s 
concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far 
keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue.’”265 
Indeed, it is important to recall that the very purpose of 
the TCPA was “to prohibit certain practices involving the use of 
telephone equipment for advertising and solicitation purposes” 
and that the statute was written in response to “[t]he use of 
automated equipment to engage in telemarketing.”266 Although 
the statutory purpose sounds in privacy concerns, this is a 
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 262 See supra Section I.D. 
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statute in which the legislative history expressly states both a 
speaker preference (disfavoring telemarketers) and a content 
preference (disfavoring advertising and solicitations). The 
TCPA, in other words, is not a case in which “a facially neutral 
law . . . become[s] content based simply because it may 
disproportionately affect speech on certain topics”267—rather, it 
is a case in which “the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a 
content preference.”268 Under Reed’s two-part analysis, the 
TCPA should be subject to strict scrutiny at both steps: on its 
face it makes content-based distinctions; and even were this not 
the case, the statute’s legislative history reveals a clear 
preference both for certain types of content and for speakers 
whose speech reflects a certain type of content. 
This, of course, is an obvious conclusion. Few would object 
to receiving an unexpected (and therefore unconsented-to) call 
placed using either an automatic dialer or prerecorded message 
that carried with it welcome information. Welcome information 
about friends or family (e.g., notifications from an airline that a 
family member’s flight is delayed); information about a financial 
windfall (for instance, about a substantial award in a class 
settlement); reminders about important medical information 
(e.g., prescription refills); or civic information (e.g., about voting 
dates of polling locations). Rather, it is telemarketing 
solicitations—and especially scams and other illegitimate calls—
that are the subject of our, and Congress’s, ire.269 Primarily 
clothed in the guise of privacy concerns—concerns that were 
perhaps legitimate given the technology at the time—the TCPA 
prohibits all calls made using certain technologies in order to curb 
a certain class of calls. A law that imposes a rule to restrict one 
sort of content is content-based, even if that rule is applied equally 
to all speakers.270 Indeed, the fact that it applies broadly, 
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restricting not only disfavored speech but also other, desirable, 
constitutionally-protected speech merely demonstrates that the 
rule in question is overbroad and not narrowly tailored.271 
There are also substantial demographic differences 
between wireless and wireline telephone subscribership that 
further suggest that disparate regulation of the two should be 
subject to strict scrutiny. For instance, wireless-only telephone 
subscribers are more likely to be young, single, lower-income, 
and renters.272 “Get out the vote” calls to wireless and wireline 
telephone subscribers are, therefore, very likely to involve 
discussion of very different topics and serve very different 
functions (e.g., informing politically disengaged individuals 
about the fact of an election and their polling place locations as 
opposed to reminding politically engaged individuals to vote in a 
known election). The TCPA and FCC rules are also, therefore, 
likely to facilitate the provision of election-related information 
to known demographics of voters (e.g., homeowners with 
residential landlines), and to impose higher burdens of obtaining 
such information on other known demographics (e.g., renters, 
who are more likely to be wireless-only).273 Importantly, the fact 
that a law may have disparate effects on certain speakers or 
messages does not mean that that law is necessarily content-
based.274 But “[c]haracterizing a distinction as speaker based is 
only the beginning—not the end—of the inquiry.”275 The statute 
may nonetheless be subject to strict scrutiny if the “speaker 
preference reflects a content preference,”276 or the “inevitable 
effect of a statute on its face” is unconstitutional.277  
viewpoint neutral. To prohibit all sides from criticizing their opponents makes a law more 
viewpoint based, not less so.”); cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 831–32 (1995) (“The . . . declaration that debate is not skewed so long as multiple 
voices are silenced is simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways”). 
 271 See infra Section IV.B.3. 
 272 See STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG & JULIAN V. LUKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS WIRELESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE 
NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JULY-DECEMBER 2016 at 2, 3 (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless201705.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J2XA-4EXK]. 
 273 Id. at 4. 
 274 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (“But a facially neutral 
law does not become content based simply because it may disproportionately affect 
speech on certain topics. On the contrary, ‘[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated 
to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some 
speakers or messages but not others.’ The question in such a case is whether the law is 
‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” (quoting Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S 781, 791 (1989), then quoting Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986))). 
 275 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230–31 (2015). 
 276 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994). 
 277 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011) (quoting United States 
v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968)). 
54 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1 
The consensual relationship that exists between calling 
and called parties in some calls regulated by the TCPA creates 
a further problem that demands strict scrutiny: we are no longer 
regulating how the calling party places calls, but also how the 
called party can receive those calls. This is particularly 
problematic, as will be discussed below, in the context of the 
FCC’s reassigned number rule. This rule places a difficult—
arguably an impossible—burden on individuals who have 
consented to or even requested that they be called. 
2. The Government Has No Interest in Doing Much of 
What the TCPA Does 
The purpose of the TCPA—that is, the governmental 
interest that it was intended to serve—was nominally 
to protect the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers by 
placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the 
home and to facilitate interstate commerce by restricting certain uses 
of facsimile (fax) machines and automatic dialers.278  
As discussed above, the legislative history also expresses open 
animus towards telemarketers and the legislation was adopted 
to prohibit telephone-based advertisements and solicitations.279 
Even taking the privacy and related interests at face value, 
however, the scope of the underlying harm to privacy interests 
that the TCPA was meant to address has diminished greatly 
since the TCPA was adopted. What is more, the Act has in some 
cases come to stifle the interstate commerce it was intended to 
facilitate and to regulate activity that the government has no 
legitimate interest in controlling. 
Unquestionably, the government has a compelling interest 
in regulating and acting in response to truly harmful telephone 
calls—such as those conducted as part of scams, initiated under 
false pretexts, or made using deceptive information such as spoofed 
Caller ID information. But the TCPA does not even purport to 
narrowly regulate such calls: it purports to regulate all calls made 
using autodialers or prerecorded messages. 
a. The TCPA Does Not Meaningfully Advance Privacy 
Interests 
The TCPA was written at a time when robocalls created 
substantial privacy concerns and other tangible costs to those 
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 279 See id. at 1–3; see also supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
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receiving them, and did so in a way that the receivers could not 
avoid. Unsolicited calls would pour in every evening, disrupting 
households and families, rendering telephones unusable (including 
in the case of emergencies), filling answering machine tapes, and 
incurring per minute charges on wireless phones. 
None of these issues ring true today. The non-privacy 
issues—which are not at the core of the government’s asserted 
interests in the TCPA, but nonetheless have played a prominent 
role in its defense—are all largely moot. Autodialer technology 
has improved, such that lines are no longer blocked for any 
meaningful period of time. Answering machines are increasingly 
a thing of the past. Cell phones no longer incur per minute 
charges. And Caller ID (when not interfered with by legitimately 
bad callers), selective ring tones, easily controlled phone volume, 
and other technologies have dramatically reduced the privacy 
impact of these calls. 
A defining structural element of the TCPA is its 
disparate treatment of calls to wireless and residential wireline 
telephones. Given the statutory emphasis of this distinction, it 
is necessary to consider whether a legitimate government 
interest supports it. Today there is no legitimate reason to treat 
wireless phones differently than wireline phones. The only 
reason identified for such treatment at the time the TCPA was 
enacted, and the only reason encoded in the Act itself, is that 
wireless users incur costs when they receive calls where wireline 
users do not.280 This is no longer the case: every service plan 
currently marketed by each of the major wireless carriers 
includes unlimited voice and text service.281 To be sure, some 
plans are still offered that do not offer unlimited calling or even 
have per minute fees—but per minute costs of even these plans 
are substantially less than those which justified adoption of the 
TCPA, and these plans are rapidly disappearing.282 This is not to 
say that there is no reason to be concerned about, and possibly 
to regulate, unsolicited calls to wireless phones. But neither the 
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TCPA nor the FCC make a sufficient case for disparate 
treatment of wireless and residential wireline telephones. 
To the contrary, today there is reason to impose lighter 
regulations on wireless phones than on residential wireline 
phones.283 Telephone calls to residential wireline telephones 
present a far greater privacy burden on individuals than to calls 
to wireless phones. First, at a conceptual level, wireless phones 
are not used exclusively in the home. This is an important 
difference between them and residential wireline phones. Indeed, 
the fact that courts have long recognized a governmental interest 
in protecting the seclusion of the home from unwanted intrusion 
is one of the key justifications that the FCC cited in its 2015 Order 
for its treatment of wireless calls.284 But this interest is at least 
weakened, if not entirely abrogated, once an individual has left 
the protective sanctuary of the home and—phone in hand—
ventured into the public world where they may encounter all 
forms of ideas and expressions, wanted and unwanted. 
Moreover, wireline phones do not enjoy many of the 
privacy-enhancing benefits of wireless phones. They are 
generally shared between multiple people in a household, and 
there are often multiple phones connected to each number. This 
means that it is very difficult to “silence” a wireline phone during 
times that calls may be unwanted, especially as compared to a 
wireless phone (most of which have easy to use volume controls 
and silent-mode features). It also means that calls to residential 
wireline phones necessarily disrupt entire households whereas 
the impact of calls to wireless phones are more narrowly 
contained to individuals, such that the privacy intrusion of calls 
to residential wireline phones is greater than that of calls to 
wireless phones. Almost all wireless phones incorporate Caller 
ID features, whereas many wireline phones do not. When a call 
is received on a wireline phone, the user needs to ambulate in 
order to answer it, whereas wireless phones are generally 
carried around so are more easily checked. Wireless phones also 
often include programmable features that let subscribers 
associate different ring tones with different callers, making it far 
easier with wireless phones to know which calls to answer (or 
ignore) than with wireline phones—further reducing the privacy 
burden of unwanted calls. Additionally, wireless phones support 
text messaging, which under FCC rule is treated the same as a 
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wireless phone call,285 and which has minimal privacy impact. 
These and other features give wireless users far greater ability 
to control and mitigate the privacy concerns at the core of the 
TCPA than wireline phone subscribers have. It is questionable 
whether the government has any interest at all in regulating 
them, let alone a compelling one—and, surely, if anything, the 
interest is less than whatever interest the government may have 
in regulating wireline phone calls. 
The counterargument to this concern is that unwanted 
calls to wireless phones actually present a greater privacy harm 
than calls to landline telephones. Because individuals often carry 
their wireless phones with them wherever they go—wireless 
phones are by our sides in our homes, in our cars, at work, as we 
walk the streets, eat at restaurants, and even on our bedstands 
while we sleep—calls to them have the potential to be 
substantially more intrusive than calls to residential wireline 
phones. Our ability to control these calls on our cellphones, 
however, is substantially greater. This reduces the burden 
imposed by these potential intrusions and shifts part of that 
burden to the call recipient. Perhaps more important, however, is 
the longstanding recognition—recognized both by the courts and, 
as noted above, the FCC in its implementation of the TCPA—that 
any expectation of privacy is substantially diminished once we 
leave the sanctuary of the home.286 
b. The TCPA Interferes with Commerce 
A secondary purpose of the TCPA—one that is often 
forgotten—is to facilitate interstate commerce through restrictions 
on problematic uses of autodialers and other devices.287 As it is 
applied today, however, the Act has the contrary effect of stifling 
legitimate commerce and little-to-no effect on limiting illegitimate 
use of technologies that harm commerce. 
In reality, the TCPA has given rise to a substantial 
industry of plaintiff ’ s attorneys who specialize in using the 
TCPA to engage in predatory litigation.288 Very frequently this 
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litigation targets firms that are attempting to engage in 
legitimate business in compliance with the TCPA. But the TCPA 
is a strict liability offense with substantial statutory penalties.289 
This puts firms attempting to engage in TCPA-compliant 
activity in a precarious situation.290 
What is more, as discussed previously, the TCPA does 
little to curtail the activity of firms making illegitimate use of 
autodialers and prerecorded messages. It is these calls, and not 
those making legitimate uses of these technologies, that 
substantially harm individuals receiving them. This 
ineffectiveness is problematic in its own right and calls into 
question whether the TCPA is an appropriate means to address 
the harm it is intended to regulate at all. But it also has the 
subsidiary effect of undermining the TCPA’s statutory purpose 
of facilitating interstate commerce. A consequence of the TCPA 
and FCC rules’ inability to address these truly substantial calls 
is that individuals have widely come to view all calls as 
illegitimate, unwanted, and harmful. The shadow of those 
engaging in illegitimate business practices looms large over 
their good-faith counterparts. 
The FCC’s 2015 Omnibus Order imposed rules—since 
rejected by the D.C. Circuit—interfered with interstate 
commerce in an even more problematic way: in attempting to 
address the problem of calls made to reassigned telephone 
numbers, the Commission imposed nearly impossible burdens 
on individuals’ ability to interact with other individuals and 
firms of their choosing.291 
Reassignment of telephone numbers creates a problem 
for the TCPA: when an individual with a given phone number 
has given a calling party consent to call that number, but the 
number is subsequently reassigned to a new wireless telephone, 
the calling party does not necessarily know about that 
reassignment and therefore has no way to know whether the 
subscriber to whom a given number is assigned at a given time 
is in fact the subscriber who has offered consent. 
In its 2015 Order, the Commission attempted to address 
this issue by saying that consent follows the called party, not the 
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called number.292 This means that a calling party does not have 
consent to call a reassigned number unless the party newly-
assigned to that number has offered such consent—a 
circumstance that will never occur except in the rarest and most 
serendipitous of circumstances. In effect, under the 2015 Order, 
calling a reassigned number is almost necessarily a violation of 
the TCPA. Recognizing that calling parties do not have an 
effective way to determine whether a given number has been 
reassigned, the FCC adopted (in a show of extreme 
understanding and compassion) a safe harbor: calling parties 
are permitted a single call to a reassigned number—if that call 
does not result in an affirmation of consent, the calling party 
must assume that the number has been reassigned and that 
consent for further calls does not exist.293 It was this single-call 
safe harbor that led the D.C. Circuit to reject the FCC’s approach 
to reassigned numbers in the 2015 Order, on the grounds that 
the Commission had not articulated a reason that a single call 
was the appropriate threshold to establish as a liability shield.294 
To the extent that the FCC rationalized its approach to 
number reassignment and the one-call safe harbor, it did so as 
an effort to balance the interest of calling parties and the privacy 
interests of parties that do not want to be called. The D.C. 
Circuit faulted the Commission for having failed to provide a 
basis for why a single-call safe harbor was reasonable.295 But the 
Commission also did not consider a more important tradeoff at 
issue: the rights of parties who do want to be called, and who 
have provided consent to be called, against the rights of the 
subset of individuals who have received a reassign phone 
number on which they are receiving unwanted calls. That 
omission should be fatal to the FCC’s approach on First 
Amendment grounds, as well. It is inherently overinclusive, 
curtailing the speech between parties who have expressly 
consented to receiving calls and it is woefully underinclusive, 
doing nothing to address the greater problem of illegitimate and 
scam robocalls. What is more, as discussed below, it is neither 
narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means to addressing 
concerns created by reassigned numbers—to the contrary, the 
problem of reassigned numbers is one largely under the FCC’s 
direct control, such that the Commission itself is in a better 
 
 292 2015 TCPA Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7989–90 (2015). 
 293 Id. at 7999–8000. 
 294 See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 295 Id. 
60 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1 
position both to mitigate and to respond to the underlying 
problem than legitimate callers. 
It is important to recognize that the FCC’s rule placed a 
substantial burden on both calling parties and the parties that 
have consented to the calls. In effect, parties that have given 
such consent must actively answer every call that they receive, 
otherwise they risk an imputation that they have withdrawn 
consent to receive further calls. This is an incredible burden: it 
is both impossible and dangerous. No one is ever in a position to 
answer every call that they receive—that is why we have 
answering machines and voicemail. Moreover, callers should not 
answer every call that they receive, given the overwhelming 
number of harmful and scam robocalls that proliferate today. 
This can also be understood as another example of the relative 
benefits of adopting technologies that facilitate bargaining 
between calling and called parties as compared to trying to 
directly regulate calling parties’ conduct.296 
3. The TCPA Is Hardly Tailored at All, Let Alone 
Narrowly 
In order to survive either strict or intermediate scrutiny, 
a statute must be narrowly tailored.297 At the time it was 
enacted, the TCPA may have met that standard. Today it is 
hardly tailored at all, let alone narrowly. To the contrary, as 
currently implemented the TCPA simultaneously significantly 
fails to stop the calls that it intends to curtail while curtailing 
(or sanctioning) constitutionally-protected speech that should 
fall outside of the ambit of the Act. 
Perhaps the most fatal critique of the TCPA is its failure 
to address in any meaningful way the modern problem of 
illegitimate robocalls. The TCPA and FCC rules impose 
substantial burdens on firms and individuals that seek to be 
compliant with the TCPA and otherwise to engage in valuable 
speech activities but do little to address the pervasive illegitimate 
conduct that underlies modern concern about robocalls. Such “a 
law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the highest 
order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly 
vital interest unprohibited.”298 
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And on the other side of the equation, the TCPA not only 
curtails but places significant liability upon those who would 
engage in constitutionally-protected speech. To recount some of the 
examples discussed previously, the TCPA has been used against 
sporting venues using text messages for entertainment purposes, 
against pharmacies communicating important healthcare 
information, and services that match consumers with 
contractors.299 To be narrowly tailored, a statute “must target and 
eliminate no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to 
remedy”—”[g]overnment may not regulate expression in such a 
manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not 
serve to advance its goals.”300 The TCPA is thus problematically 
tailored coming and going, both substantially failing to prevent the 
problematic speech it is intended to curtail and curtailing other 
speech that the government has no interest in limiting. 
It is ill-tailored in other ways, as well. For instance, one 
of the TCPA and the FCC rules’ basic distinctions is between 
commercial and noncommercial speech. But both informational 
and commercial calls impose the same privacy burden on those 
receiving the calls. The relevant characteristic is not whether 
the call is commercial, but whether it is desired. The TCPA’s and 
FCC’s rules place no consent burden on informational calls to 
residential landline phones but do place consent burdens on any 
calls to wireless phones and all commercial calls. This disparate 
treatment necessarily implies at least one of two things: either 
the lack of restrictions on informational calls to residential 
wireline phones is underinclusive, or the consent requirements 
for other calls is overinclusive. 
There can be little doubt that it is the restrictions on calls 
for which consent has been given that is overinclusive. The basis 
in Central Hudson for subjecting commercial speech to a lower 
standard of scrutiny than noncommercial speech is that there is 
a “distinction between speech proposing a commercial 
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to 
government regulation, and other varieties of speech.”301 But 
where the called party has already consented to being called—as 
it must have under the TCPA—we are already beyond the point 
of “proposing” a commercial transaction. The parties have already 
agreed that one may call the other for the purposes of conducting 
that transaction. This is not unsolicited commercial speech but 
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rather consensual speech between parties who have indicated a 
willingness and desire to engage with one another. 
The arbitrariness of the FCC’s approach to consent under 
the TCPA is demonstrated by the differential consent requirement 
for information and commercial calls to wireless phones. The 
purpose of the different consent regimes is not to narrowly tailor 
the implementation of the TCPA to minimize the impacts on 
speech. It is to harmonize the FCC’s TCPA rules with the FTC’s 
telemarketing rules, which require written consent prior to placing 
telemarketing calls to any number on the Do Not Call list.302 There 
are certainly virtues in harmonizing regulations, but those virtues 
do not relate back to or otherwise advance the privacy interests 
that underlie the TCPA. 
The FCC’s reassigned numbers rule was similarly 
arbitrary. As described above, this rule implicitly preferences the 
rights of those who have been given a reassigned telephone 
number over the rights of those who have consented to receiving 
calls on their (non-reassigned) telephone number. In adopting 
this rule, the Commission did not so much as acknowledge that 
its rule affects individuals who have consented to receive calls, let 
alone attempt to quantify the relative effects this rule has on 
those who have been given a reassigned number and receive 
unconsented-to calls as a result compared to the effects on those 
will lose the opportunity to engage with those from whom they 
have consented to receive calls because of the one-call safe harbor. 
The failure to even consider these relative effects—had the D.C. 
Circuit not already rejected the rule on other grounds303—should 
be problematic on First Amendment grounds. 
4. There Are, and the Government Controls, Less 
Restrictive Means of Addressing Robocalls 
At the time it was enacted, the TCPA very likely addressed 
substantial government interests—indeed, likely even compelling 
ones—in an appropriately narrow way. The most clearly 
problematic distinction in the TCPA as initially drafted was its 
carve-out for different treatment for wireless phones. But given the 
different cost structure of wireless service, even that was very 
likely reasonable. Most of the problems with the TCPA laid out 
above are the result of either: changing technology mooting the 
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concerns addressed by and creating new ones unaddressed by the 
TCPA or problematic implementation of the TCPA by the FCC. 
And today, unwanted phone calls continue to be a bane 
and a plight. The government very likely has a compelling 
interest reining in a vast majority of the calls that lead to 
consumer complaints. Many of these calls are undesired; many 
result from reassigned numbers; many are scams and frauds; 
many result from unscrupulous lead-generation services. The 
government should do something about these calls. 
In the early 1990s, there was little that the government 
could do, short of the blunt instrument adopted in the TCPA. 
This is no longer the case today. Technology has advanced 
considerably, and myriad tools could be implemented or 
developed today that would dramatically reduce the burdens of 
robocalls to individuals in ways far less burdensome to those 
making legitimate calls. To its credit, the FCC has begun 
making serious progress on this front in the past year. 
One simple thing that the Commission can do—which it 
mercifully is in the process of doing—is to allow telecommunications 
companies to block known scam calls.304 Scam calls regularly use 
spoofed Caller ID information, transmitting a fake phone number 
instead of the caller’s real number. Telephone carriers can easily 
identify most of these faked phone numbers and could easily block 
them at the network level.305 This solution is feasible today, lacking 
only the FCC’s permission to be implemented.306 
To emphasize the point: carriers today are not blocking 
known harmful calls because the FCC does not allow them to do 
so. Changing this policy, and thereby addressing a substantial 
portion of the robocall problem, is fully within the government’s 
control. There can be no question that any restriction on speech 
that the government’s own action could render unnecessary is 
not the least restrictive means to address a problem. 
Similarly, the problem of reassigned phone numbers is 
fully within the FCC’s control—indeed, it is a problem of the 
FCC’s own making. Telephone carriers reassign phone numbers 
when they do not have previously-unassigned numbers to assign 
customers. Previously-unassigned numbers are doled out to 
carriers by the North American Numbering Plan Administration 
(NANPA), an entity operated under contract for the FCC.307 
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NANPA and the FCC determine who gets new phone numbers 
and at what time.308 They also have the authority to regulate the 
use of those numbers, including their reassignment.309 In other 
words, the government itself could largely address the 
reassigned number problem by allocating more new numbers or 
imposing rules to govern how numbers are reassigned. Here, too, 
the FCC is taking positive steps, having recently adopted and 
undertaken efforts to implement a database of reassigned 
numbers that would be updated on a daily basis.310 
Other technological solutions to the robocall problem would 
require technological changes to the architecture of the telephone 
network. Over the past decade many in the telecommunications 
industry have sought to transition the traditional Public Switched 
Telephone Network—which today is largely the same as it was at 
the time the TCPA was adopted—to a modern, IP-based, digital 
network.311 This process has been dramatically slowed by the FCC 
itself and by advocacy groups seeking to preserve the legacy 
network for various interests.312 
Fortunately, here too the FCC has recently embraced 
proposals to modernize aspects of the telephone network in light 
of, and to address concerns about, the robocall problem, having 
recently adopted a Notice of Inquiry soliciting comments on new 
authentication technologies that would make it dramatically 
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more difficult to forge Caller ID information and that would give 
called parties much more control over the calls that they 
receive.313 A modernized network could incorporate myriad 
features that would help address the problem of robocalls 
without the need for blunt regulations like the TCPA. For 
instance, it could enable strong authentication of calling parties, 
such as what is now under consideration by the FCC—a super-
Caller ID of sorts, that prevents spoofing but that also provides 
authenticated text-based identification of a caller. It could 
enable coding of calls, so that callers could signal the nature of 
the call (e.g., friend/family, professional, political, informational, 
customer service, commercial offer, etc.) in a way that would 
minimize any privacy impact on call recipients. Or it could even 
incorporate brief text descriptions of the purpose of a call into 
the call information itself, allowing called parties to know the 
purpose of the call without needing to answer it. None of these 
technologies is particularly sophisticated or complicated—
arguably, the FCC should have mandated their adoption years 
ago. Instead, it has stepped in the way of the market, preventing 
such technologies from being developed and deployed. 
Any of these technologies would present less restrictive 
means to addressing the problem of robocalls, either in whole or 
in part. By and large, the only reason that they have not already 
been implemented is because the government itself has not 
allowed them to be. Needless to say, a government regulation 
cannot be the least restrictive means to addressing a problem 
that a government regulation itself has caused and that the 
government itself has the ability to directly remedy. This point 
is redoubled by the fact that the FCC is, in fact, actually working 
to implement many of these technologies. 
V. A BETTER APPROACH 
None of this is to say that there is nothing that the 
government can or should do to address the very real problem of 
robocalls. The discussion above, which focused on the less 
restrictive means available to the government as ways of 
addressing the problem of unwanted robocalls, begins to catalog 
the range of better options available to the government. For 
instance, there are content-neutral rules that could be put in 
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place; the government can regulate speech that is not protected 
by the First Amendment; and there are non-speech regulations 
that could be put in place. 
Two such approaches are discussed below. The first 
articulated approach is the adoption of a specific, technology-
neutral, rule against unsolicited communications. Unlike the 
TCPA, this rule would be framed in terms of preventing a specific 
type of harm (privacy-invading communications that impose real 
costs on the recipient), as opposed to clumsily targeting a specific 
technology as a means of curtailing a disfavored type of speech. 
The second approach is more general, arguing that regulation of 
unsolicited calls should focus, at least in part, on improving the 
technological state of the art in order to reduce the underlying 
problems of unwanted calls instead of taking the current state of 
technology as static, and developing rules that are dictated by its 
current capabilities and limitations. The purpose of this 
discussion is not to be exhaustive or to put forward specific policy 
proposals. Rather, it is to demonstrate the scope and viability of 
regulations to address the contemporary problem of robocalls that 
can be implemented in ways that are not onerously burdensome 
of protected speech. 
A. Technology-Neutral Prohibition on Unsolicited Costly 
Communications 
As a starting point, any regulation should be neutral as 
to both technology and content. The TCPA presents a story of 
how technologies can develop over time to be more or less 
suitable for different uses, such that different technologies 
become associated with different types of content. That is, 
different ways of making phone calls—residential landline 
versus wireless voice versus text message—may ultimately 
become akin to the signs regulated by the Sign Code at issue in 
Reed.314 Where it may be appropriate to regulate specific 
technologies in different ways today, such differentiation should 
be framed in terms of the specific factors requiring such 
treatment, not in terms of specific technologies that possess such 
factors today. Thus, for instance, the TCPA would have been 
better written if it was more restrictive of “phone calls or 
communications in which the called party bears the cost of the 
communication” instead of specifically targeting wireless 
telephone calls. There is a far more compelling case to be made 
that the government has an interest in regulating unsolicited 
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speech that imposes unavoidable and direct costs on the party 
receiving it than that it has an interest in regulating unsolicited 
calls to cellular telephone. 
There may also be a strong case to be made for the 
regulation of unsolicited calls generally, as discussed below. 
Such regulation, however, should not subject different calls to 
different treatment based upon the content of the call—indeed, 
following Sorrell and Reed, it is questionable whether such 
regulations can even subject clearly commercial speech to 
differential treatment. The greatest challenge for regulation of 
unsolicited calls is the requirement—under any level of 
scrutiny—that the rules be narrowly tailored and use an 
appropriately restrictive technological means of regulation. 
Prescribing such rules in light of a rapidly changing 
technological landscape is a fraught task, particularly where the 
government itself plays a direct role in regulating the 
development and implementation of the relevant technologies. 
In order to ensure that government regulation of 
unsolicited calls is implemented by appropriate means, any 
enforcement action against a caller premised on the manner in 
which they made the call should be subject to a defense 
challenging the constitutionality of the manner in which the rule 
regulates speech. Importantly, this effectively precludes private 
causes of action that are premised upon the means by which a 
call was made—any suit challenging the manner of speech 
would need to be brought by the government (or provide for 
government involvement in challenging the defense). To take 
one example, prior to the advent of the Do Not Call Registry, 
autodialers may have been inherently problematic; but 
subsequent to the advent of the Do Not Call Registry autodialers 
that ignore the Registry are inherently problematic, whereas 
those that do adhere to it are far less problematic. Yet nothing 
about the TCPA or the FCC’s implementation of it has 
incorporated this fundamental change in the landscape—from 
the FCC’s perspective, all autodialers are the same no matter 
whether a given one makes use of the Do Not Call Registry. 
This does not mean that there can be no private cause of 
action for problematic calls. For instance, fraudulent or 
deceptive calls likely are not constitutionally-protected speech. 
Such calls could include calls using spoofed Caller ID 
information, made without consent to individuals on the Do Not 
Call Registry, or made under pretextual circumstances to 
fraudulently establish consent. The most important role for the 
government to play in ensuring against such harms, either 
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through government or private action, is to ensure development 
of both structural and conduct remedies to protect against them. 
This may include, for instance, criminalizing the spoofing of 
Caller ID or other authentication information except where 
necessary to protect the caller from certain delineated harms. 
But it would also include requiring the development and 
implementation of more robust network-level identification and 
authentication mechanisms. 
B. Make It Easier to Coordinate Desirability of 
Communications 
By and large, the clearest role for the government in 
addressing the problem of problematic phone calls is using its 
authority to regulate telecommunications services to ensure that 
those services are designed and implemented in ways that give 
individuals and telecommunications carriers the tools needed to 
identify and respond to unwanted calls. The central theoretical 
conundrum of the TCPA is one of transaction costs and Coasean 
bargaining.315 At the time of the TCPA’s enactment, it was 
technologically difficult (if not even impossible) for unsolicited 
callers to communicate about the intent or nature of their calls 
without establishing a complete call. The high costs of 
bargaining between calling and called parties prior to a call 
therefore justified a strong liability rule entitling a called party 
to significant damages.316 But as technologies change, the 
viability of pre-call bargaining changes too, such that the legal 
rules should change as well. And, importantly, whatever legal 
rules exist can affect the development of new technologies—in 
the case of the TCPA, a too strong prohibition on unsolicited calls 
can stymie the development of technologies that would facilitate 
desirable unsolicited calls. 
As discussed in Part IV, the TCPA can be criticized on the 
ground that the government is regulating speech in order to 
address problems with how the telephone network is used, when 
the government could instead directly address the problems 
through regulation of how the network is operated or designed.317 
Fortunately, as discussed there, the FCC in recent years has been 
working to address some of these operational and design aspects 
of the network. This is an overwhelmingly positive development—
and one that should be continued and expanded upon. 
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The most basic and most startling part of the robocall 
problem is that these calls persist because the telephone network 
facilitates them.318 Given the state of the technology as it existed at 
the time the TCPA was adopted, there was little better that could 
be done. In its 1992 TCPA Order, the Commission considered 
alternative technological and regulatory approaches to mitigating 
the impacts of robocalls and came up empty-handed.319 But as 
technology has advanced dramatically in the years since, the FCC 
has continued to think about robocalls from the technological 
mindset as it existed in 1991. Indeed, the FCC itself has prevented 
the networks from taking action against callers that are known to 
be problematic—it has not been until the past year that the 
Commission has seriously considered allowing telephone carriers 
to implement technology that blocks known harmful callers or to 
empower called parties to take greater control of the time, place, 
and manner in which calling parties can intrude upon their 
solitude by making their phones ring.320 
The flipside of this observation is that the government 
should endeavor never to prohibit or interfere with consensual 
calls. Rather, a more productive (and, incidentally, constitutional) 
task would be to facilitate the development of more sophisticated 
features to allow both calling and called parties to establish, 
demonstrate, and revoke consent. Again, these are features that 
are best implemented at the network level, and they are therefore 
well within the FCC’s core competencies to work with industry to 
develop and implement.321 
Such an approach requires a fundamentally different 
regulatory philosophy than what has been on display in the 
Commission’s previous TCPA rules. This is perhaps best on 
display with the Commission’s attempted approach in the 2015 
Order on reassigned numbers.322 This problem is, first and 
foremost, the responsibility of the FCC to address. The FCC 
oversees the North American Numbering Plan (NANP) and the 
NANP Administration (NANPA). And, indeed, the problem of 
number reassignment in many ways results from FCC and 
NANPA’s decision to allocate carriers smaller blocks of new 
numbers.323 Yet the Commission’s approach to the problem of 
individuals on reassigned numbers receiving unconsented-to 
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calls was to burden the speech of callers and the consenting 
intended recipients of those calls. The better approach to the 
problem of reassigned numbers—both pragmatically and in view 
of the First Amendment—would be for the Commission to 
regulate the process by which telecommunications carriers 
reassign numbers. Rather than put the burden of addressing the 
problems created by number reassignment on the speech of 
consenting parties, the FCC should place the burden where it 
belongs: on the networks and number reassignment procedures 
that create the problem. For instance, the NANPA could alter 
how it allocates new numbers to better take the volume of 
number reassignment into account. The FCC could impose rules 
that, for instance, prevent numbers from being reassigned for 
some period of time, in order to facilitate callers learning that 
numbers have been disconnected and screening of disconnected 
numbers that receive inordinate numbers of calls (and, 
therefore, should not be reassigned). Finally, the FCC could 
oversee the creation of a reassigned-numbers database that 
autodialers could consult to learn about number reassignments 
and discontinue calls. 
CONCLUSION 
Unwanted phone calls are one of the most detested 
common occurrences in modern American life. With as many as 
4.1 billion robocalls placed monthly, each telephone customer in 
the United States is likely to receive well over ten of these calls 
every month, with some receiving far more. 
Understandably, most people want these calls to stop—
and the TCPA was put in place to realize that goal. 
Unfortunately, the TCPA has proven entirely ineffective at 
accomplishing it. A strong majority of the most problematic calls 
are made using technologies that make enforcement difficult, 
hiding the identities of the caller. Many of these calls are 
outright scams, where the call is a pretext to acquiring 
information to be use as part of some other scheme. At the same 
time, legitimate businesses that use telephone calls for socially 
desirable purposes are often caught up in the TCPA’s web of 
strict liability and statutory damages—a web that has given rise 
to a substantial industry of class action attorneys that often prey 
on innocent mistakes of companies that seek to be TCPA 
compliant. And the TCPA surely keeps other productive uses of 
the telephone from ever making it off of the drawing board—all 
in a vain attempt to stifle illegitimate callers who are largely 
undeterred by the TCPA. 
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This article has revisited the First Amendment challenges 
to the TCPA in light of legal and technological change since the law 
was adopted in 1991. Recent Supreme Court precedents suggest 
that the law is better evaluated under strict scrutiny than 
intermediate scrutiny. Changes in technology substantially 
weaken the privacy interests that the government has asserted as 
the constitutional basis for the TCPA. The statute has proven to 
abridge socially valuable speech and has proven wholly ineffective 
at curtailing undesirable and harmful speech. And, perhaps most 
audacious, the government itself pervasively regulates the 
telephone network—as such, it can implement technologies that 
better address these problems. But rather than facilitating their 
development, it has historically limited what telephone carriers 
could do to combat these universally detested phone calls. 
(Fortunately, the FCC has recently begun exploring new 
regulations to reverse this trend.) Regardless, a law that regulates 
speech to address a problem that is itself better addressable 
directly by the government is facially not narrowly tailored. 
The simple fact is that consumers do not dislike these phone 
calls because of the technological nature of the calls. They dislike 
them because they bear unwanted messages. An automatically-
dialed prerecorded message informing someone that they have 
received a financial windfall, or that a family member has arrived 
at the airport, or that a prescription has been filled may will be 
received warmly. A call made using the same technology that is 
part of a scam, or advertising unwanted services, is likely 
disfavored. This is true regardless of whether the calls were 
consented to or expected, and regardless of the technology by which 
they were made. 
Rather than regulate speech—trying to prohibit certain 
types of callers from transmitting certain types of unwanted 
messages—a better statutory and regulatory approach is to 
encourage the development of consumer-facing technologies that 
empower them to control who can call them and for what 
purposes. At the time the TCPA was adopted such technologies 
were infeasible. Today they are not—indeed, the FCC is actively 
exploring many of them. The advent and implementation of these 
technologies would—and, hopefully, will—render the TCPA an 
unnecessary statute. Today, however, the fact remains that many 
legitimate businesses and individuals acting in good faith and 
attempting to comply with the TCPA have been caught in its web 
of liability, and that few of the bad actors intended to be targeted 
by the statute are deterred by it. It is time we stop silencing Peter 
in this vain attempt to quiet Paul. 
